Matches Are Not Toys

Europe Discovers the Bomb

Nuclear weapons are not an attribute of a refined lifestyle, nor a means of self-assertion in front of anyone. It would be very good if this understanding returned to the West before we find ourselves at the edge of a general catastrophe.

The debate over whether the spread of nuclear weapons strengthens international stability or undermines it has continued almost since the emergence of this lethal technology. Each side in the discussion sounds convincing in its own way. Advocates of a wider distribution of nuclear arsenals argue that nuclear weapons function primarily as a tool of mutual deterrence. They provide reassurance to weaker states and compel stronger ones to rely on diplomacy rather than force. A number of scholars seriously believe that nuclear proliferation reduces the number of wars simply because states are unwilling to escalate conflicts to a level beyond which total or partial mutual destruction becomes possible. The Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the United States is often cited as an example, as are contemporary relations between India and Pakistan, where the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides is widely believed to have put an end to truly large-scale wars between them.

Opponents of this approach maintain that nuclear weapons can be entrusted only to a narrow circle of states that, due to the sophistication of their governance systems, are capable of handling them responsibly. Most countries, they argue, lack experience with such weapons, do not understand the implicit rules of the game, and may commit fatal errors simply out of irresponsibility. The underlying logic fits neatly into a basic rule of fire safety, namely that matches are not toys for children. The absence of historical cases in which such fears have materialized gives rise to reasonable suspicions that warnings about the dangers of proliferation are merely a way to preserve a monopoly in the hands of a limited group of states.

As a result, there is still no clear answer to the question of whether the spread of nuclear weapons stabilizes the international system or makes it more dangerous. Reality, however, does not stand still. India and Pakistan have already become nuclear powers, North Korea has declared itself one, and Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, even though its government has never officially confirmed this.

The current discussion is being fueled by U.S. foreign policy behavior and by the crisis in relations between Washington and its European allies. A few days ago, respected, though former, Brazilian diplomats publicly suggested that Brazil should seriously consider developing its own nuclear weapon. The reason, unsurprisingly, was the new U.S. policy declaring the entire Western Hemisphere a zone of exclusive American influence.

European voices have been far louder. Calls are coming from Europe to extend the French and British nuclear umbrellas to all European NATO members. This has been stated officially by French President Emmanuel Macron and, more recently, by Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference and a prominent German diplomat. In the latter case, the reasoning bordered on the contradictory, if not the curious. According to one of Europe’s most formally authoritative figures, the European Union requires its own nuclear deterrent as a means of self-assertion in the eyes of the United States, Russia, and China. Germany, in this vision, could assume the role of bridge builder between Europe and the United States on nuclear matters, so that Americans, God forbid, would not think that their allies intend to manage without them in the future.

This framing simultaneously demonstrates the degree of intellectual decline reached by Russia’s largest neighbors in the West and the extent to which their understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the modern world has shifted. First, because arguments about the need for a European nuclear umbrella have no direct connection to international security. Nuclear weapons have always mattered primarily to states that genuinely face threats to their existence. The most obvious examples are North Korea and Israel. Pakistan fits this category in a certain sense, given that it can never match India demographically. For the USSR, the creation of nuclear weapons was a means of preventing an almost inevitable direct confrontation with the United States and, in the 1960s and 1970s, of deterring China from adopting an overly aggressive strategy.

It is difficult to imagine any major power intending to pose a threat to Europe of such magnitude that risking nuclear apocalypse would be a rational response. The only thing Europe’s neighbors, Russia above all, seek is for Europe to stop interfering in their internal affairs, creating security threats, and destroying international economic ties. This is well understood in Germany, France, and the rest of the European Union. Nevertheless, they continue to behave as though they require an instrument of such destructive power for protection from the outside world.

Second, European discussions about acquiring their own nuclear weapons are clearly nothing more than manifestations of disagreements within the so-called collective West, which has entered a phase of evident crisis. Sharp changes in American rhetoric have not yet translated into meaningful practical steps. The Trump administration speaks about reducing its presence in Europe and pressures allies over Greenland and Ukraine, but has no intention of withdrawing its own nuclear weapons from the European Union.

What the United States has succeeded in doing is provoking a visibly nervous reaction among Europeans. Calls by Macron, supported by prominent German thinkers, are part of this agitation. For Europe, talk of nuclear weapons represents no more than a tactical, even rhetorical maneuver in its current disputes with Washington. Nothing more. Macron, if it came to concrete decisions, would certainly refuse to place French nuclear weapons under German control, let alone under the authority of Brussels bureaucrats. The same applies to the British, who are generally less inclined to assume risks themselves and more experienced at encouraging others to step in front of oncoming buses.

Yet nearly everyone in Europe is willing to discuss the issue, simply because even the most potentially dramatic matters in the world are no longer taken seriously there. Europe has grown so accustomed to having no real influence over international affairs or even over its own position that it is prepared to speak lightly about nuclear weapons in yet another attempt to intimidate the Americans. As though Washington were unaware of the true value of such talk.

What we are witnessing is that Europe has become precisely the inexperienced and irresponsible player for whom nuclear proliferation can legitimately be viewed by others as a threat. The paradox is that the most decorated participant in global affairs, the creator of the modern system of international law, now appears markedly less mature than its former colonial possessions in Asia or Latin America.

In international politics, nuclear weapons are not an attribute of a beautiful life and not a means of asserting oneself before others. Possession of such weapons carries enormous responsibility and cannot become an object of petty political speculation aimed at media effect. It would be very good if this understanding returned before we truly find ourselves on the brink of a general catastrophe.