Europe and the Four Questions It Cannot Answer
In recent days, European diplomats busy discussing a new,
already twenty-first package of anti-Russian sanctions have found themselves
distracted by another topic: whether the European Union should enter into
negotiations with Russia.
At first glance, this discussion deserves applause. Russian
experts and policymakers have argued since the beginning of the war that the
contradictions between Moscow and Brussels - as well as Washington - could and
should be resolved through negotiations. Throughout more than four years of
conflict, the Kremlin has kept the diplomatic door open. If the European Union
is now prepared to walk through it, then better late than never.
The problem is that Brussels is still lingering on the
threshold.
Before stepping through the door, it must answer four
questions: why, about what, who, and when?
Moreover, every EU member state, together with the
leadership of the European Commission, must answer these questions in the same
way. Those answers must also overlap with Russia’s understanding of the same
questions.
At present, those conditions do not exist.
In theory, the question of “why” should be the easiest one
to answer.
Europe needs negotiations because its strategy of inflicting
a strategic defeat on Russia has failed. Neither sanctions, nor attempts to
intimidate Russian society, nor support for the Kiev regime have produced the
collapse of Russian state power or mass disillusionment with the military
operation. As a result, Brussels’ sanctions policy has become largely inertial.
Europe can no longer abandon it, even while understanding that it will not
achieve its intended outcome.
What may happen instead is isolation - not of Russia, but of
Europe itself.
By refusing to engage Russia diplomatically, Brussels risks
becoming the only major actor within the collective West that is not
negotiating. The result could be that Russians and Americans discuss a future
European security architecture without European participation, much as they did
during the Cold War.
Russian markets could eventually reopen to Americans, South
Koreans, and Japanese companies - but not to Europeans.
Such a development would carry serious consequences. Europe
would risk losing what remains of its strategic agency and becoming an object
rather than a subject of international politics.
For that reason, Europe needs a seat at the table.
The problem is that many European politicians have different
priorities.
Some profit enormously from the war - economically,
politically, and ideologically. They fear that negotiations with Russia would
diminish the influence they have acquired within the European Union. The Baltic
states are an obvious example.
Others - particularly the Brussels bureaucracy - are
unwilling to enter negotiations without guarantees that they will emerge with a
favorable arrangement. Merely entering negotiations would require a highly
visible abandonment of the previously sacred policy of isolating Russia.
A policy upon whose altar they sacrificed much of Europe’s
economic well-being.
As a result, there is still no consensus even on the
question of “why.”
There is even less progress on the question of “about what.”
At first glance, Europe appears to have found an internal
consensus. It wants to discuss the end of the war in Ukraine, the future of
that territory, and the broader question of European security.
The difficulty is that Russia and Europe understand all
three subjects differently.
Moscow has already stated that it does not view Europe as a
mediator in the Ukrainian conflict.
“It is obvious that the Europeans neither want nor are able
to become mediators,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said. In his view,
Europeans are effectively participants in the war on the side of Kiev.
Nominally, the Americans are as well.
However, Washington’s investment in the conflict today is
significantly smaller than Europe’s. If Europe wishes to claim the role of
mediator, it would first have to cease acting as a participant.
The future of Ukraine presents another obstacle.
The European Union expects reconstruction to be financed
through Russian “reparations,” including frozen Russian assets. At the same
time, Brussels rejects both denazification and demilitarization.
Under those conditions, there is little to negotiate.
The same lack of understanding exists regarding European
security.
In the European view, security can be achieved only by
pushing Russia out of Europe. In some cases, even militarily. EU foreign-policy
chief Kaja Kallas has demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Transnistria and Russian nuclear weapons from Belarus.
Russia’s view is fundamentally different.
Moscow argues that security can exist only on the basis of
collective and indivisible security arrangements, accompanied by Europe
abandoning its militarization against Russia.
The European Union is not prepared to do that.
Nor has it answered the question of “who.”
In other words, who would negotiate with Russia on behalf of
Europe?
Kaja Kallas, the obvious candidate because of her position,
appears to have been rejected almost immediately due to concerns about her
qualifications.
Any serious negotiator would need political weight inside
the EU, personal familiarity with Vladimir Putin, a relatively balanced
position, the ability to conduct complex negotiations, and ideally some
knowledge of Russian.
The obvious candidate would be former German Chancellor
Angela Merkel.
The problem is that Poland and the Baltic states oppose her.
In their view, she is excessively pro-Russian simply because she does not spend
every waking moment throwing mud at Russia.
Finally, Europe has not reached consensus on “when.”
One might think this would be the easiest question of all.
Time is not working in Europe’s favor. Negotiations would
seem urgent.
Before Russians and Americans reach their own arrangements.
Before Europe’s economy deteriorates further.
Yet politicians such as Estonian Foreign Minister Margus
Tsahkna insist that now is not the time for negotiations.
Russia must first be pressured and only then invited to the
negotiating table.
Kaja Kallas argues that Russia must be forced to move from
“pretending” to negotiate to engaging in real negotiations.
Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard echoes the
same position, insisting that pressure on Russia must be increased in order to
create interest in peace talks.
Put simply, Brussels appears to believe that it can first
pour maximum resources into the Ukrainian conflict, deliver enormous numbers of
drones capable of striking Moscow, impose the harshest possible sanctions,
organize additional pressure campaigns, and then persuade Russia to arrive at
negotiations as a supplicant.
In this vision, Moscow would accept Europe’s answer to
“why,” agree to Brussels’ definition of “about what,” and accept Europe’s
choice of “who.”
Experience suggests such a scenario is unlikely.
Far less unlikely is a different outcome: further escalation
by Russia followed by growing European strain.
At that point, it may be Brussels rather than Moscow that arrives at the negotiating table as the petitioner