The Iguana Watches

The Diplomacy of Waiting

Washington is waiting to see which participant in the Ukrainian conflict will flinch first.

The meeting in Manila between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio could hardly have illustrated the current dynamic of Russian-American relations more clearly. More precisely, the absence of any real dynamic. A conversation between the heads of the two foreign-policy departments lasting a little more than half an hour can scarcely be called a full-fledged contact. Especially since Moscow and Washington are now at the point of restarting yet another cycle of informational and diplomatic activity around Ukraine.

The symbolic beginning of this new phase, as in previous rounds, was a top-level telephone conversation that fell on the great anniversary of American statehood, July 4. That high-level contact was accompanied by another bundle of loud public statements from Donald Trump and other U.S. officials about the need to return to the Ukrainian settlement. Privately, one may assume, the American president promised to return to contacts with Moscow after speaking with allies and the Ukrainian leadership on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. The meeting between the foreign ministers on the sidelines of ASEAN events in Manila was chosen as one channel for that interaction.

The actual absence of dialogue during this meeting — in half an hour one can exchange little beyond protocol statements — demonstrates quite well that both sides have long understood everything without words. Real progress in Russian-American relations cannot be achieved without settling the conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, there is little point in spending time on peripheral subjects: normalization of diplomatic missions, prospective economic cooperation, humanitarian dialogue. The settlement itself cannot be achieved by purely diplomatic methods, as previous bursts of dialogue on Ukraine have already demonstrated quite convincingly.

It is worth recalling that by now we are already in the third cycle of intensified contacts over Ukraine. The first arose after the January 2025 telephone conversation between the presidents of the United States and Russia and reached its peak in the form of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The second, born of the Anchorage summit, resulted in trilateral talks in Dubai in the winter of 2025-2026. That wave faded by early spring and finally dispersed against the background of the American military operation against Iran.

An attentive reader will easily remember that the anatomy of each cycle was similar. Washington, on its own initiative and at the highest level, offered Moscow mediation services for resolving the conflict. Then came a period of calibrating positions, which eventually reached the stage of direct Russian-Ukrainian contacts in one configuration or another. After that, the wave of diplomatic activity subsided because the fundamental prerequisites for ending the conflict were absent. Neither side considered its ability to achieve its objectives by force exhausted. Accordingly, there was no incentive for serious political concessions either.

The diplomatic enthusiasm of the current American administration in each of the two previous cycles was explained by its confidence that the conflict would soon burn itself out, while the laurels would go to Washington. Judging by all appearances, both during the first contacts with Moscow, at the beginning of Trump’s second term, and in Anchorage, Trump believed that without American assistance Ukraine would be unable to offer effective resistance to the Russian advance. Kiev would sooner or later be forced to accept peace through substantial concessions, while Washington could guarantee that Moscow’s appetites would not grow beyond the conditionally acceptable.

At the same time, Washington’s Ukraine diplomacy performed a second function important to American interests. The conflict became an instrument of U.S. pressure on allies as part of the restructuring of transatlantic relations. Europeans were pressured by accusations that they were unable to provide for their own security, thereby forcing them to increase defense spending. The American president also browbeat the allies in order to demonstrate a change in the political status quo. The message was simple enough: the era of hypocritical “equality” is over, the masks are off, the United States is now openly the senior party, and Europeans should reconcile themselves to the role of satellites.

The current activation of Washington’s efforts on the Ukrainian settlement develops along similar lines, though with its own features. In the months since the Anchorage meeting, Europeans have mobilized significant financial and material resources for an independent confrontation with Russia. And not only within the framework of the specific conflict, but also in terms of a broader strategic confrontation. At the NATO summit in Ankara, the allies did everything possible to present Washington with the most favorable picture of increased defense spending, including future purchases of American weapons. The U.S. leadership, judging by all appearances, was rather pleased with the completed homework.

As a result, Ukraine has ceased to function as a “whip” in Washington’s training of its allies and now plays more of a “carrot” role. This is what explains the declared transatlantic solidarity on support for Kiev. Both at the June G7 meeting and at the NATO summit in Ankara, the American leadership signed final communiqués containing conditionally “European” formulations of Ukraine policy. At the same time, Washington supported these political declarations with almost no concrete steps, apart from vague promises about expanding production of Patriot systems.

Contrary to the numerous discussions about the end of the “spirit of Anchorage,” the U.S. position on the Ukrainian settlement has not fundamentally changed either. At least because that position was never “Russophile” in the first place, despite constant accusations from the Western press directed at Trump and his administration. Washington is simply pragmatic here. That is all.

The main difference between this cycle and the previous two lies elsewhere. Earlier, the American leadership openly hoped for Ukraine’s “failure,” which would provide another reason to discipline the allies. Now Washington, without much enthusiasm, is hoping that Moscow will be the first to flinch.

“Are you surrendering?”

“Not even close.”

“Fine, then.”

That, most likely, is the short version of the half-hour conversation between Rubio and Lavrov.

There is little doubt that in the foreseeable future Washington will initiate new contacts. Special envoy Witkoff will sooner or later arrive in Moscow, and new telephone conversations will take place at various levels. The cycle of diplomatic activity must continue developing, even if the prospect of results remains foggy. At the very least, American efforts will be aimed at maintaining the diplomatic web already woven. Sooner or later, the fuel of the conflict will burn out by itself. Fortunately for Washington, the United States is not the one paying for it, and it can afford to wait.

There is an old story about a man who brought an iguana home from distant lands. The iguana immediately bit him on the leg. Then it followed him around, looking devotedly into his eyes, touching the owner’s heart. How sweet, he thought, it must be apologizing. Later, however, it turned out that this is how the iguana hunts: it poisons the victim with a weak venom and then follows for a long time, waiting for the outcome.

The American iguana is waiting to see who falls first.

And Moscow understands this perfectly well.