The Rearmament Trap
Europe is committing itself to a substantial military
transformation. At the Hague summit in June 2025, NATO members agreed to raise
annual defense and security-related spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. That
figure combines at least 3.5 percent for core military requirements with up to
1.5 percent for infrastructure, resilience, networks, and related purposes. The
commitment includes annual national plans and a review in 2029. It establishes
a long-term direction for public spending and military preparation.
The European Union has supplied a corresponding financial
framework. Its Readiness 2030 initiative envisages mobilizing up to €800
billion in additional defense expenditure, including a €150 billion loan
instrument known as SAFE. These figures describe potential financing and
commitments. Their conversion into deployable forces still requires production
capacity, trained personnel, logistics, and agreement among governments - items
that generally move more slowly than a summit communiqué.
NATO presents this effort as deterrence and defense against
a long-term Russian threat. The European Commission identifies concrete
capability gaps, including air and missile defense, ammunition, military
mobility, drones, and strategic transport. Those stated purposes matter.
Establishing an intention to launch an offensive war would require additional
evidence about political decisions, force posture, operational planning, and
preparations for attack.
The more consequential question concerns what happens after
the buildup begins. Can European governments maintain political control over a
military transformation whose economic and institutional consequences will
extend across a generation? Or will the policies adopted to manage insecurity
gradually make continued confrontation a condition of political survival?
The economic attraction of a permanent emergency
The global economy continues to grow. The IMF’s July 2026
outlook projected growth of 3 percent that year and 3.4 percent in 2027, with
substantial differences between countries exposed to the costs of war and those
benefiting from technological investment. Such figures describe an uneven,
pressured economy with continuing sources of expansion.
A struggle over the distribution of that growth can
nevertheless become extremely dangerous. A country may remain prosperous while
losing influence over the rules under which prosperity is produced. Its
factories may continue operating while its technological advantages narrow, its
financing becomes more expensive, or its suppliers acquire greater bargaining
power. For an established great power, accepting a smaller share of influence
can be politically harder than accepting a disappointing annual growth figure.
This is the defensible core of the argument about systemic
crisis. The contest concerns who controls markets, resources, technology,
financial access, and the institutions that allocate advantages among states.
An international hierarchy can become unstable while the world economy,
considered in aggregate, continues expanding.
A less expansion-dependent, “sufficiency-based” economic
model is conceivable. Its implementation would require agreement over
consumption, investment, distribution, and the limits of geopolitical
privilege. The difficult discussion would begin with the question of who should
accept less. Governments usually approach that question with considerable
enthusiasm when the proposed sacrifice belongs to somebody else.
Military spending offers an immediate political attraction
under these conditions. For a government seeking industrial activity and a
demonstration of authority, defense procurement supplies an identifiable
customer, protected demand, and a vocabulary in which subsidies become
contributions to national survival. Factories receive orders, workers receive
wages, and ministers acquire something tangible to open in front of television
cameras.
The economic benefits come with a bill. The IMF’s April 2026
study of defense spending found that, during a typical major buildup, roughly
two-thirds of additional expenditure was financed through higher deficits.
Public debt increased by about seven percentage points of GDP within three
years. Military spending can stimulate activity, especially where production is
domestic; its wider effects depend on financing, imports, investment quality,
and the pressure placed on other public priorities.
The political risk emerges when entire constituencies become
dependent on the continuation of the emergency. Contractors expand facilities,
regional authorities anticipate employment, military organizations develop new
requirements, and governments attach their reputations to the proposition that
confrontation will last. A negotiated reduction in tension can then acquire
domestic opponents whose objections have payrolls attached.
This remains a conditional mechanism. Armed forces can
justify their cost through successful deterrence. A stockpile can fulfill its
purpose by persuading an adversary to refrain from attacking. The dangerous
turn comes when political leaders begin treating the avoidance of war as an
inadequate return on their investment.
The related idea that destruction could provide the world
economy with a useful restart deserves particular skepticism. Reconstruction
creates demand because productive assets have been destroyed and must be
replaced. The IMF’s research on conflict finds persistent losses to output and
living standards, with recovery frequently slow and incomplete. The improvement
in a contractor’s order book is an exceptionally narrow measure of what has
happened to the country around it.
America’s more selective empire
Washington has its own reasons to reconsider the
distribution of military burdens. In its February 2026 baseline, the
Congressional Budget Office projected net federal interest expenditure of
approximately $1 trillion in 2026, rising to $2.1 trillion in 2036. These are
interest payments, distinct from repayment of the principal. CBO described the
fiscal trajectory as unsustainable. The figures establish mounting pressure on
American priorities; they provide ample grounds for arguing about who should
pay for overseas security.
One possible response can be described as “second
isolationism”: a substantial reduction in distant commitments, a concentration
on the American hemisphere, and an attempt to regain fiscal and industrial room
for maneuver. At its most ambitious, this would involve Washington accepting
greater Russian and Chinese influence in their respective neighborhoods in
return for recognition of American predominance closer to home.
The published American strategy supports a more selective
interpretation. The December 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly
prioritizes American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and a
reconsideration of global military deployments. It simultaneously calls for
stronger capabilities in the Western Pacific, defense of the first island
chain, and greater contributions from allies. The policy combines geographic
reprioritization with continued competition for influence.
For European governments, this produces an awkward
possibility. They may be asked to finance a larger share of their defense while
Washington retains considerable influence over the strategic framework. The
patron can remain on the premises while steadily transferring the maintenance
bill to the tenants.
From the American perspective, a more capable Europe could
absorb responsibilities that otherwise consume American resources. From the
European perspective, the same arrangement could create obligations that grow
faster than independent decision-making capacity. The actual balance would
depend on control over technology, intelligence, logistics, procurement, and
the political authority to decide when military capabilities are used.
The risk of abandonment therefore has several possible
forms. It could involve a withdrawal of forces. It could also involve selective
support, more demanding conditions, reduced readiness to accept escalation, or
a refusal to underwrite objectives that Washington considers peripheral. An
alliance can become substantially less reassuring while retaining its name,
headquarters, and an excellent schedule of anniversary celebrations.
The bargain that would be paid for by the allies
A more radical scenario envisages a settlement among
Washington, Moscow, and Beijing that stabilizes relations among the largest
powers at the expense of their smaller partners.
In this scenario, Russia secures a decisive outcome in
Ukraine and restores dominant influence over the western part of the former
Soviet space. China establishes a stronger strategic position beyond the first
island chain. Faced with these changes, Washington accepts a redistribution of
influence and concentrates more heavily on its own hemisphere. European and
Asian allies then discover that their security arrangements have become
negotiable components of a larger bargain.
This is a scenario for analysis. The public policy documents
examined here establish competing priorities and changes in burden-sharing;
they leave such a comprehensive three-power agreement hypothetical.
Its attraction to the principal participants would be
understandable. Each might hope to reduce the risk of direct nuclear
confrontation, consolidate a defensible area of influence, and obtain time to
address domestic economic problems. The costs could fall disproportionately on
states whose security and prosperity had depended on the previous arrangement.
The mechanism, however, would be much more complicated than
dividing a map into three colors.
Even within Europe, Britain and France possess separate
nuclear forces and national centers of decision-making. NATO itself recognizes
that these complicate an adversary’s calculations. A settlement negotiated by
three capitals would therefore still have to reckon with other governments
possessing significant means of resistance.
Economic dependence also creates leverage of varying
strength. Its effectiveness depends on alternative suppliers, transport routes,
inventories, industrial substitution, prices, and the time available for
adjustment. Control over a neighboring territory or maritime position can alter
that balance. Converting such an advantage into permanent political obedience
would require a further series of assumptions about the behavior of the
countries being pressured.
The idea that Europe and parts of Asia could be forced into
subordinate arrangements through restricted access to resources is consequently
plausible as a coercive strategy. Its success would be contingent. Countries
facing exclusion can attempt diversification, accept higher costs, reorganize
production, or seek new coalitions. The suppliers applying pressure must also
calculate the consequences for their own revenues and customers.
Any Russian or Chinese strategy for revising the
international order would face this problem. A functioning economy, access to
markets, and dependable payments would remain valuable after a diplomatic
victory. A settlement that preserves productive relationships could provide
lasting advantages. A settlement that requires permanent economic strangulation
would bring recurring costs and recurring resistance.
The distinction matters particularly when resource
redistribution is presented as a means of buying time for a new economic model.
Time purchased through an arrangement that every subordinate state seeks to
overturn may prove more expensive than its architects expect.
The danger lies in the timetable
The strongest warning concerns the competing calendars of
military preparation.
European governments may expect that several years of
rearmament will improve their negotiating position. Moscow may conclude that
those same years will make any eventual settlement less favorable. In Asia, an
analogous calculation can develop around Chinese military modernization and the
strengthening of American and allied positions. Each side begins evaluating
present restraint against a feared future disadvantage.
This is a recognizable security dilemma. Robert Jervis
described how policies intended to improve one state’s security can make others
feel less secure, encouraging reciprocal measures that leave everyone facing
greater danger. His analysis also identified conditions that can reduce the
problem, including distinguishable defensive postures and advantages favoring
defense. The outcome depends on the structure of the competition and the
choices made within it.
Rapid changes in relative power create an additional
difficulty. Robert Powell’s work on commitment problems explains how an
expected shift in capabilities can undermine a bargain: the side anticipating
decline may doubt that a stronger opponent will honor tomorrow the restraint it
promises today. That fear can create incentives for preventive action.
Here the argument for establishing overwhelming regional
superiority before an opponent completes rearmament encounters its most serious
problem. A campaign intended to close a future vulnerability could trigger the
wider conflict its authors believe they are preventing. The opposing side may
interpret decisive territorial or military advances as confirmation that rapid
mobilization is essential.
The entire situation can then become a competition to act
before the other side is ready. Each government describes its own timetable as
prudence. Each reads the other’s timetable as preparation for aggression. The
room for compromise shrinks because delay itself begins to look dangerous.
Russia is already deeply involved in this military-economic
transformation. SIPRI estimated Russian military expenditure at approximately
$190 billion in 2025, or 7.5 percent of GDP. Worldwide expenditure reached
about $2.89 trillion, the eleventh consecutive annual increase. These figures
place the European buildup within a wider process affecting rival powers with
different resources, objectives, and degrees of mobilization.
For Moscow, the practical question is whether additional
military pressure improves the prospects of an acceptable settlement or
strengthens the coalitions preparing for a longer confrontation. Beijing faces
its own version of that calculation. Military capability can support
negotiations; its political value depends on what the other side believes that
capability will be used to achieve.
A local settlement can also leave wider strategic
competition intact. Ending the fighting in Ukraine would still leave disputes
over European security, force deployments, sanctions, and future alignments. A
settlement around Taiwan would raise its own questions about regional military
access and political guarantees. Durable arrangements would therefore have to
address the sources of insecurity that survive the immediate conflict.
What nuclear Germany and Japan would actually mean
Independent German or Japanese nuclear arsenals would
constitute major changes in the international security system. They would
introduce additional national decisions about nuclear use and force neighboring
states to reconsider doctrine, warning systems, and escalation risks.
Precision is essential here because several different
developments are frequently placed under the same heading.
Germany participates in NATO’s nuclear arrangements, under
which the United States maintains control and custody of its forward-deployed
nuclear weapons. France and Germany are also developing closer strategic
cooperation. Their July 2026 declaration described a bilateral Nuclear Steering
Group, a French strategic-aircraft deployment to Germany, and planned German
conventional participation in a French nuclear exercise. These measures concern
cooperation within existing deterrence arrangements.
An independent German arsenal would involve a separate
decision about ownership and national control, carrying substantial legal
implications. Germany’s 1990 reunification settlement expressly reaffirmed its
renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear weapons.
Japan has its own framework. The three non-nuclear
principles announced in 1967 cover possession, production, and the introduction
of nuclear weapons. Debate over the admission of American weapons concerns the
terms of extended deterrence. The development of a sovereign Japanese arsenal
would entail an additional and much more consequential choice.
The analytical threshold should therefore be defined through
concrete decisions: authorization of a national weapons program, changes to
relevant obligations, development of military production facilities, and
establishment of independent command arrangements. Political discussion,
conventional rearmament, and cooperation with an existing nuclear power each
require their own assessment.
Even the appearance of a new nuclear arsenal would leave its
consequences dependent on doctrine, deployment, command security, and the
behavior of neighboring states. It could intensify an arms race and complicate
crisis management. Its acquisition would be a grave warning, with implications
extending far beyond the country concerned. Assigning it the status of an
automatic trigger for world war would give a complex political process a
certainty it does not possess.
The political point of no return
A more useful understanding of the “point of no return”
concerns the cumulative cost of reversing policy.
The danger rises when military orders become indispensable
to employment, when governments have made confrontation central to their
legitimacy, when emergency measures become routine, and when compromise is
treated as evidence of betrayal. Under those conditions, leaders can retain the
formal authority to negotiate while losing the domestic room to make
negotiation meaningful.
That threshold would vary between countries. It would also
become clearer in retrospect, by which time its identification would be of
limited comfort to those who had crossed it.
Preventing such an outcome requires a political purpose for
military preparedness that includes a defined route to settlement. Governments
need to specify the security conditions under which they could reduce
deployments, modify sanctions, accept reciprocal restraints, or restore
economic cooperation. Otherwise, every new capability can become the
justification for another round of demands.
Practical arrangements would have to be negotiated and
verifiable: limits on particularly destabilizing deployments, notification and
inspection mechanisms, reliable crisis communications, protection of critical
civilian systems, and reciprocal steps that allow governments to explain
de-escalation to their own publics. A workable settlement would also require
the participation of the states expected to live with its consequences.
Economic policy belongs in the same discussion. If defense
production is allowed to become the principal answer to industrial weakness,
governments will acquire an expanding interest in the conditions that sustain
defense orders. Civilian investment, infrastructure, productivity, and viable
trade relationships can give domestic constituencies a material interest in
stability. Peace needs beneficiaries capable of recognizing their own
interests.
The central risk is a convergence of calculations that each
government considers reasonable on its own. Washington seeks to reduce burdens
while preserving influence. European governments seek greater capacity while
fearing abandonment. Moscow and Beijing seek to prevent an unfavorable shift in
the balance around them. Manufacturers seek predictable orders, and political
leaders seek evidence that their previous decisions were justified.
Taken together, these calculations can produce a situation
that none of the participants can comfortably control.
The remaining diplomatic window should therefore be
understood as an opportunity to establish limits while governments still have
the freedom to accept them. Waiting for absolute superiority, complete economic
conversion, or a perfectly favorable balance could allow that opportunity to
disappear in the preparations.
Europe can spend years building the means to deter a war.
Its more difficult task is to ensure that, at the end of those years, its
politics still permits a settlement.
Otherwise, the weapons will have arrived on schedule, and
the purpose of buying them will have quietly changed.