A Matter of Time: How Can Russia Secure Control Over Odessa and Nikolaev?

Dr. Tszo Fu

Q: It is widely acknowledged that Russia seeks to secure its strategic position by denying Ukraine access to the Black Sea. Presently, there is significant concern regarding the future of Odessa and Nikolaev. In your assessment, is the military capture of these cities feasible? What resources and time frame would be required for such an operation? Does Russia possess the necessary capabilities? Alternatively, is there a non-military approach that could enable Russia to take control of Odessa and Nikolaev, and what conditions would facilitate this? In your opinion, what would be the most prudent strategy concerning these cities?

A: I have consistently stated that neither the capture of Odessa, Nikolaev, nor even Zhitomir would, on their own, resolve Russia’s broader security challenges. Addressing these challenges, especially over the coming century, requires the complete dissolution of Ukraine as a political entity. This applies to any form of Ukraine, even one professing eternal friendship, because the current conflict illustrates a critical point: Ukraine, a state that has historically received support and development from Russia, and whose existence was significantly shaped by Russian influence, has nonetheless engaged in hostilities against Russia for several years.

If a Ukraine that has experienced primarily positive relations with Russia can engage in prolonged conflict, then any future Ukraine—especially one that has endured significant casualties (possibly over a million in an initial conflict)—will inevitably be better prepared and more resolute in subsequent confrontations. Should Ukraine not be decisively defeated now, a second conflict will prove substantially more challenging, while a third confrontation would almost inevitably escalate into a global nuclear crisis. An undefeated Ukraine will continuously inspire Russia’s adversaries, motivating them to forge new, more formidable coalitions aiming to leverage the Ukrainian strategic position for renewed aggression against Russia.

Thus, it is imperative to dismiss speculative narratives that circulate online—claims such as "Crimea has consolidated, Donbass too, albeit less firmly, while Zaporozhye and Kherson have yet to consolidate, but they are nevertheless Russian cities because they likely intended to consolidate, and Odessa and Nikolaev are beginning to lean in that direction." The core issue is not about specific cities or populations. The fundamental matter at stake is Russia’s security, and addressing it requires the neutralization of Ukraine and the ideological construct of "Ukrainianism," which functions as a disruptive force against Russian identity.

It is crucial to understand that "Ukrainianism" is not an ethnic identity. Historically, even the Galician Ruthenians, who were among the first to be labeled as Ukrainians (a designation originally imposed by the Poles within Austro-Hungary), continue to identify as Galicians rather than Ukrainians. Embracing "Ukrainianism" is a conscious ideological decision, often made by individuals of Russian heritage. In this context, the ideology of "Ukrainianism" poses a more profound threat to Russians than German Nazism once did to Jews. While Nazism aimed to physically eliminate Jews without assimilating them, "Ukrainianism" not only seeks to eradicate Russian identity but also recruits individuals of Russian descent who have abandoned their cultural roots. As I have often noted, the neo-Banderite slogan "kill the Russian within you" is not merely rhetorical but accurately reflects the ideological transformation process inherent in the formation of a Ukrainian national identity.

Regarding the practical feasibility of capturing specific cities, I believe that Nikolaev, Odessa, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and other key urban centers will inevitably fall under Russian control once the Ukrainian Armed Forces are decisively defeated and lose the ability to maintain a continuous frontline. Given the increasing pace of Ukrainian retreats and the rising casualty numbers—losses that can no longer be compensated through mobilization—the realization of this outcome appears imminent.

The only scenario likely to halt this progression and compel Russia to seek a negotiated settlement—or more accurately, a truce (pending a subsequent conflict with Ukraine)—would be a severe economic crisis, though current official data does not support such a prospect. Aside from this potential economic disruption, I do not see any objective, non-subjective reasons for Russia to refrain from completing the dismantling of Ukrainian resistance at this time.