European politicians behave as if Russia has any reason whatsoever  to listen to them 

European states have seriously fallen behind the rest of the world, and even if relations are restored, Russia will face the question: what useful things can it gain from Europe?

In his speech to journalists on May 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "sooner or later, including by relying on the lessons of history and the opinions of our peoples, we will begin to move toward restoring constructive relations with European states."

Given the current state of Russia's relations with its Western neighbors, such a statement by the head of state may seem aimed at the distant future—at present, there are simply no grounds to see any signs of adequacy in Europe. The phrase could be interpreted as mere politeness, which is an integral part of Russian foreign policy culture.

However, this is not the case. While staying true to themselves, Russians should not prematurely rule out the most unexpected foreign policy developments—provided, of course, that the necessary conditions arise, the main ones being the adequacy of partners and the benefit to Russia from relations with them. For this to happen, Europe must undergo serious internal political transformations. These changes must be internal because European behavior on the world stage is directly linked to what is happening within their own countries. Once that is achieved, a normal diplomatic dialogue will naturally follow.

No doubt, at the moment, speaking of Europe as a potential partner for constructive relations with Russia requires an incredible dose of optimism. Just a few days ago, we all witnessed an astonishing gathering in Kiev, where the leaders of Britain, Germany, Poland, and France issued a real ultimatum to Russia. What’s even more striking isn’t so much the content of their demands—they lack practical significance—but the tone and posture accompanying these diplomatic moves.

An outside observer is struck by how European political leaders are now behaving as if Rthe Russians—or anyone else—have any reason whatsoever to listen to them. It’s truly strange and looks like a complete loss of touch with reality.

In recent months, everyone has had plenty of opportunities to realize that Europe poses no independent threat to Russia. Not only because it lacks the military or economic means to do so, but primarily because, in recent years, it has destroyed the connections that could have been relatively valuable to Russia. The only thing Europeans are capable of is provoking a situation whose consequences will have to be dealt with by their American patrons. In other words, the danger coming from Europe may be related not to its strength but to its weakness.

This, one should agree, is a solid reason to view European ultimatums in a "special" way. First and foremost, to be astonished by their leaders, who adopt a lecturing and patronizing tone towards Russia. These actors, in 2025, speak as if Russia is still a country from the 1990s—devastated by an economic crisis and forced to listen to any nonsense coming from Berlin, Paris, or London.

We do not yet know what the specific contours of a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian issue will look like. We do not know how long the negotiation process will take, nor how many more human lives will be lost due to the arrogance and shortsightedness of the West after the Cold War. However, we understand that contemporary politicians in Europe are a product of their time. Almost all of them, with few exceptions, have grown up with the belief that they will never have to bear responsibility for their actions. The situation is tragic and leads to complete emotional apathy, to which the response becomes a clownish performance in the style of the already familiar Emmanuel Macron or the new British Prime Minister.

But history does not stand still, and after a certain number of years, Russia's Western neighbors may well come to realize the extent of their responsibility within the limited range where Europe will still represent something in the global economy and politics. So far, this path has not even reached the halfway point—they are only at the beginning. What happened to the European powers in the 20th century clearly proved insufficient. Especially since the dramatic end of the Cold War became a celebration for them, convincing them of their own infallibility despite their complete political insignificance.

Now, the era that followed the Cold War is finally fading into the past. And if, in a few years, a global military tragedy does not occur, Europe will be forced, in one way or another, to adapt itself to a global political landscape where it will never again hold a significant place.

This means that changes will occur within European states. We are already seeing examples where the citizens of these countries demand change despite all attempts by the traditional establishment to deny their voters the right to determine anything about their own lives.

In some places, these processes will unfold faster—Germany and France are the main candidates for that within the next 10–15 years. In countries like Britain, things will be much more complicated—the system’s resilience, built over centuries to ensure that the elite remains unaffected by how citizens feel, is too strong. Small European countries or southern nations like Italy, Spain, and Greece will generally accept the new realities without much pain: they have long ceased to have any significant influence, which fosters a relatively sober outlook on life.

As for Russia’s smaller neighbors, like Finland or the former Baltic republics of the USSR, they will quietly replace completely unreasonable figures with relatively calm and businesslike ones. These new leaders will rush to rebuild ties with Russia just as energetically as they are currently building barbed-wire fences on our western borders.

And at that point, Russia will face an important question: what, in fact, can it gain from Europe?

It is no secret that, while enjoying their prosperity, European states have seriously lagged behind the rest of the world in the development of modern technologies. This is primarily due to local legislation that limits the ability to invest in the field of artificial intelligence on par with the leaders of this race—the United States and China. In recent years, we have seen that in industries where Europe could have been an investment partner for Russia, other countries are stepping in to take its place.

In the field of education, Europeans also find it difficult to offer Russia anything of interest—it is entirely geared toward rather primitive extraction of intellectual resources. At one time, EU countries considered their achievements in public administration to be an advantage. Most of the programs that kept consulting companies in Brussels and European officials thriving were specifically about transferring such "advanced" technologies to Russia. However, now Russia itself is ahead of the EU in such crucial areas as the digitalization of public services.

After Europeans, through a serious reform of their political systems, eventually adapt to the surrounding world, Russia will then have to understand what useful things we can gain from them. For more than 500 years, Europe has been Russia's most important neighbor—both as a source of threat and as an example of societal and institutional development. Both of these roles, in the Russian eyes, will soon become part of history. And once relations with Europe are restored, as correctly predicted by the head of the Russian state, Russia will need to know why they are necessary for Russia’s development and the well-being of its citizens.