A Labyrinth With Only One Exit
The much-anticipated talks between Vladimir Putin and Donald
Trump’s envoys - Special Representative Stephen Witkoff and
presidential Special Son-in-Law Jared Kushner -
produced nothing that could be described
as news. Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov merely noted that the conversation “went
well.” The follow-up meeting those same envoys were expected to hold with
Zelensky never happened at all, despite Zelensky’s efforts to intercept them in
Europe. Disappointment and speculation followed, but in reality everything
unfolded exactly as it had to. Each actor simply moved along its familiar
corridor, and all those corridors, as in any such labyrinth, led to the same
exit.
Kiev, represented by Zelensky, refuses to sign any
meaningful peace agreement. Acceptance of the joint Russian-American demands - above all the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces
from Donbass - risks a spontaneous uprising, a coup, and
Zelensky’s removal from power. Rejecting those demands risks a rupture with
Washington and equally serious internal consequences. Zelensky therefore
professes support for “peace,” while sabotaging the process whenever possible:
by rejecting key Russian conditions or by staging demonstrations of
recklessness, such as attacks on tankers in the Black Sea, intended to show
Washington and Moscow that he is prepared to fight to the end unless they bend
to him.
Europe’s position is essentially a mirror image. Europe also
rejects peace, because peace today can be reached only on Russian terms - terms intolerable to the current European
elite. Brussels performs its own displays of bravado, including open hints that
it is prepared to confiscate Russian assets outright. At the same time, Europe
is forced to consider the future: the 45-billion-dollar hole in Ukraine’s 2026
budget, the danger that Moscow and Washington may reach an agreement without
Europe, and the fragmentation of EU foreign policy as more member states begin
to speak about Russia in pragmatic rather than ideological terms. Hence Europe’s
constant oscillation between panic and posturing.
The United States, compared to Europe, looks almost
constructive. The Trump administration genuinely wants to end the war and
normalize relations with Russia. This is why Washington continues talking to
Moscow. Yet Trump’s position remains weak: he lacks domestic consensus,
dismantling sanctions will be difficult, and he has no real leverage to force
Europe or Ukraine to cooperate. Nor can he give Russia too much without
inviting accusations of capitulation. Any deal must be presented as a Western
success, preferably before Ukraine’s situation becomes openly catastrophic.
Russia is ready to sign a peace agreement at any moment and
to negotiate with any party capable of acting constructively. Moscow has
clearly marked its red lines and will not retreat from them. The Kremlin shows
no irritation at Washington’s inability to follow through; Russia understands
the constraints on Trump and is prepared to wait until the United States either
gathers the strength for a serious conversation with its allies or withdraws
from the process entirely.
All of this produces the labyrinth effect: the sides move,
the negotiations continue, but none of the movements change the trajectory. The
end is already visible: a partial or complete American exit from the conflict,
Europe stretched beyond its political limits, and a military defeat for the
Kiev regime. Diplomacy is kept alive only because abandoning it would attract
universal condemnation.
Even so, no labyrinth is perfectly sealed. Sometimes an
unplanned exit appears.
One scenario is an American-engineered constitutional
reshuffle in Kiev, transferring authority to the Verkhovna Rada. Parliament
could then accept the terms Zelensky rejects.
A second scenario is a collapse of Europe’s unified policy,
depriving Kiev of its European support and forcing it to accept whatever
Washington dictates.
A third is the collapse of the Ukrainian front itself, after
which what remains of the regime would accept any terms in order to retain
minimal territorial control.
For now, the odds of such exits are small. But they exist. And as long as they exist, there remains the possibility that the war will end before the Kiev regime exhausts itself completely.
