Power Without Annexation
Over the past several days, statements have again
emerged from Washington to the effect that the United States “very much needs”
Greenland. The tone this time is noticeably harsher than during the “purchase”
episode of 2019. This is no longer an eccentric offer framed as a real estate
transaction, nor a diplomatic probe. It is a return to an older American logic
in which strategic territories are discussed not from the standpoint of law,
but from the standpoint of power. In the twenty-first century, that power is
increasingly presented indirectly, through references to strategy, security,
and objective necessity. As a rule, such necessity appears in American foreign
policy precisely at those points on the map where future bases and logistical
routes are being outlined.
Historically, the United States has resolved
similar issues in much the same way, from the Louisiana Purchase to pressure
surrounding the Panama Canal. The difference today lies mainly in presentation.
In the twenty-first century, the logic of force is more often masked by
discussions of stability. In practical terms, Washington first determines what
it requires and only then decides how this requirement will be legalized,
whether through purchase, agreement, pressure, or special circumstances.
Lawyers enter the process later, in order to explain why what occurred should
be understood not as a seizure, but as a natural evolution of events.
Greenland fits neatly into this tradition. For that
reason, such statements in Washington are perceived not as an aberration, but
as an acceptable instrument, even if allies express public indignation. History
suggests that indignation is often part of the calculation. In some cases, it
functions as a planned cost item, comparable to infrastructure expenses or
diplomatic compensation.
Why, then, are the United States raising this issue
at all? There are three practical reasons. The first concerns military
geography and early warning. Greenland is the key to the Arctic corridor.
Control over Greenland translates into control over the northern approach to
the United States. In this logic, distance is measured not in kilometers, but
in missile flight time, as military planners like to say.
The second reason lies in the growing strategic
importance of the Arctic as an arena of competition with Russia and China. For
the Pentagon, the Arctic is not a future scenario, but an ongoing game. In that
game, Greenland is not a piece, but the board itself.
The third reason involves resources and supply
chains. Greenland matters not only as territory, but as a potential source of
critical minerals. This aligns with the broader American effort to reduce
dependence on Chinese-controlled resource chains, which Washington would prefer
to place under its own supervision well in advance.
Why resort to threats when negotiation is possible?
The answer is straightforward, because a threat is also a form of negotiation.
It is not a last resort, but a starting position. This is particularly true in
American political culture, where maximum demands are stated first and
bargaining follows later. Donald Trump has already accustomed the world to this
method. At the same time, Washington understands perfectly well that annexation
is costly and highly visible. Control is cheaper and appears far more
respectable. That is why talk of annexation functions as a convenient
scarecrow. The real objective is more mundane and therefore more dangerous,
namely control without formal responsibility.
The United States will not seize Greenland.
Washington already possesses workable instruments that provide nearly
everything it needs without annexation. Nothing prevents further expansion of
military presence and infrastructure through existing agreements, including the
Pituffik base and associated systems. Within the Arctic agenda, this remains
the most realistic path. Nor is there anything to stop political and economic
pressure on Copenhagen and Nuuk in order to accelerate acceptance of American
terms without prolonged European bureaucratic delays. The United States can
also invest directly in resource and infrastructure projects, consolidating
influence through capital and contracts rather than through a flag.
Aggressive rhetoric, however, will continue. It has
already proven effective, both as a factor of partial European consolidation
and as a means of placing the Arctic firmly at the center of the agenda. Most
likely, Washington will continue bargaining over the format of American
military expansion and political guarantees, without preparing for any landing
operation. Even cautious European ministers who have commented on the situation
question the plausibility of a direct move against Greenland because of the
consequences for the entire system of allied obligations.
The principal reason the United States will not
take Greenland by force lies in the fact that any annexation would place
Washington in the position of an aggressor against the territory of an ally,
Denmark. This would automatically trigger a chain of legal, political, and
military consequences that the United States would be unable to manage on its
own. Unlike operations against external adversaries, it would be impossible to
invoke self-defense or special circumstances in a convincing manner. A seizure
of Greenland would undermine the very logic of American leadership in the
Western world, where power is legitimized not by its use, but by recognition
from allies. For Washington, this would mean a loss of trust, manageability,
and strategic reputation, at a cost entirely disproportionate to any benefit
the island could offer.