The Fourth Strategy?
With
the beginning of Donald Trump’s second presidential term, the world has
encountered a unique diplomatic problem, one that has not really appeared for
at least a century. The question is how to deal with him, and how to resist his
pressure or, calling things by their proper names, his bullying.
For
many years we were told about a supposedly bullying, aggressive American
diplomacy that respected no one. Yet it was harsh but still operated within
certain limits. Even the aggressive George W. Bush, in his confrontation with
the so-called “axis of evil,” and Joe Biden, who declared a struggle against
the “axis of autocracies,” observed at least the formal courtesies of
diplomatic communication. They tried, at least outwardly, to justify their
positions through international law.
Trump,
however, seems determined to embody the very caricature created by
anti-American propaganda. The current head of the White House behaves on the
international stage in an openly aggressive and bullying manner. He threatens
full-scale war against a number of countries, speaks about overthrowing their
regimes, imposes sanctions or trade tariffs on anyone who displeases him. For
example, those who refuse to hand over sovereign territory or decline to
support one of his initiatives. And not only adversaries fall out of favor.
Yesterday’s allies, such as France or the European Commission, can also become
targets.
The
question, then, is how the world should deal with such a president of the
United States. Different countries and actors are trying several strategies,
but none has yet proven effective.
The
first strategy
is compliance. A number of states, led by politicians close to Trump or
critically dependent on the United States, such as Hungary, Argentina, Ecuador,
and to a large extent Japan, have tried to adapt themselves as much as possible
to the current American president and avoid contradicting him. They try not to
provoke his anger, not to fall under the hot hand of sanctions, and even to
extract benefits from his policies.
At
first glance this seems reasonable. The American president clearly appreciated
the total support of the Hungarian leader and the emotional enthusiasm of the
Japanese prime minister during his visit.
Yet
this line of behavior has at least two serious drawbacks. First, it worsens
relations with countries that are not prepared to submit to Trump’s bullying,
and this is dangerous when dependence on those countries exceeds dependence on
the United States. Hungary’s readiness to support any White House initiative
provokes serious anger in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. That could easily result
in additional sanctions from the European Union.
Second,
Trump is not inclined to protect his loyal followers. The Hungarians saw this
during their conflict with Kiev, when the Ukrainian authorities bombed
pipelines supplying Russian hydrocarbons to Hungary. The Japanese will learn
the same lesson if Trump decides to stabilize relations with China without
regard for the views of his regional allies, even those who promised to fight
alongside the United States over Taiwan.
The
second strategy
is waiting it out through humiliation. This is the approach now taken by most
European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and others. The logic is to avoid
provoking Trump, not to respond to his bullying with counter-bullying, to
express readiness for constructive negotiations even on unacceptable demands,
and even to sign unequal agreements. The trade deal between the United States
and the European Union, which obliges the EU to purchase hundreds of billions
of euros’ worth of American goods, is one example.
The
goal is to buy time until Trump leaves office in 2028 or at least loses the
midterm elections in 2026. After that, European leaders hope to repair
relations with new authorities in Congress or the White House and revise the
unfavorable agreements. Some of them may not even pass the full ratification
process.
But
this strategy also has at least three major weaknesses. First, weakness does
not produce sympathy from Trump. It encourages him to press harder. Once he
extracts one concession, he sees the softness of his counterpart and
immediately pushes for the next. That is why the trade deal with the EU was
followed by demands for increased defense spending, and then by pressure over
Greenland.
Second,
the sacrifices may be pointless. Trump might win the midterms, or his political
heir, such as Vice President J. D. Vance, could win the presidency in 2028.
Third,
even if Democrats win, there is no guarantee they will return to pre-Trump
arrangements. Many of them share the same logic that weakness invites further
pressure.
The
third strategy
is used by a number of developing countries, including Iran, Cuba, Venezuela,
and to some extent China, as well as some Western leaders such as those of
France and Canada. It consists of open resistance. These countries respond
sharply to Trump’s bullying and demands, threaten financial or even military
retaliation, and hope to beat him at diplomatic poker. The idea is to create
unacceptable risks for the White House and force it to retreat.
Sometimes
this works. Trump has shown readiness to negotiate over Greenland and refrained
from intensifying the trade war with China. But in most cases he still wins the
diplomatic poker game simply by flipping the table. Then he not only makes
foreign governments look weak before their own voters, but also convinces
himself they are paper tigers. After that, he pays far less attention to their
threats, knowing they have little behind them.
At the
same time, none of the countries currently in serious conflict with the United
States has tried a fourth strategy: total resistance. Not just publicly
refusing the demands of an American bully, but also visibly and convincingly
demonstrating readiness to use military and economic force.
Iran,
for example, did not sink American ships, level U.S. bases, or block the Strait
of Hormuz during the American strike on the Islamic Republic in 2025. Europeans
did not demand the removal of American bases after Trump threatened Greenland.
Venezuelans did not attack the American fleet during the blockade of their
country and did not take hostage the U.S. State Department delegation that
arrived in Caracas after President Nicolás Maduro was captured, even though he
could have been exchanged for American officials.
At
first glance, this strategy looks like suicide. It could provoke a full-scale
conflict with Washington. But in practice the result might be very different.
Inside the United States, Trump has many enemies who criticize him for his
foreign policy adventures. So far he deflects those attacks by pointing to
victories, or at least the absence of defeats. But one sunk American destroyer,
one group of hostage diplomats, one loss of hundreds of billions of dollars
caused by the blockade of global trade routes would become a political
catastrophe for the American president. Especially if those losses occur during
operations widely viewed in the United States as legally questionable.
Yes,
this strategy is risky. But it may be the only effective way to deal with
Trump. He is a man who respects only strength in international relations,
whether his own or someone else’s. He enjoys easy victories, but he tries to
avoid the risk of heavy defeats. And he is willing to bully only those leaders
who allow it.