Natural Causes
The United States wants to fight China no more than
it wanted to fight Russia.
Even less, in fact. With Russia it was possible to
wage a proxy war while shielding itself behind Ukrainian proxies. Supporting
allies in the Pacific in the event of a military clash with China would be a
different matter entirely. Even supplying weapons, military equipment, and
ammunition without direct confrontation between the American and Chinese fleets
would be nearly impossible.
For that reason, Washington places its bet on
economic pressure. The key condition for success in such a strategy is the
isolation of China from sources of raw materials and from markets for its
exports. In other words, the interception of trade routes. Naturally, Chinese
commercial arteries must be cut in such a way that Beijing cannot directly
accuse the United States. To repeat: the United States does not want to fight
China. Trade routes therefore must be interrupted for “natural reasons.” Local
countries suddenly decide to fight. Or “the people” somewhere once again gather
to overthrow a “criminal regime.” If wars and revolutions occur at the right
time and in the right place, trade becomes difficult.
And now the Afghan Taliban, with whom China and
Russia have been trying to build relations, begin a military campaign against
Pakistan. Pakistan is an ally of China and has been developing relations with
Russia as well. The formal pretext is the Taliban’s rejection of the Durand
Line, the border drawn after the Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century
between British possessions and independent Afghanistan, which split Pashtun
tribes into two parts.
The Durand Line is unjust in the same way as any
modern border. All borders have been established through military conflict,
through the will of victors, or through compromise. There are areas of compact
Polish settlement in Lithuania and Belarus, Germans in Tyrol, Hungarians in
Romania and Transcarpathia, and so on. Afghanistan itself contains Tajiks,
Uzbeks, and Turkmens separated by borders from their national states. In short,
one can fight for “fair borders” forever. Why did the Taliban suddenly wish to
fight now? The same question could have been asked recently when they were
settling border issues with Iran.
The Taliban have been present in big politics from
the very birth of the movement. They immediately fell into the focus of
intelligence services - American, Pakistani, Saudi, Turkish, British - and
later of the politicians of those same states. Gradually the scope of their
involvement in the global political game expanded. During twenty years of
confrontation with the American occupation they established relations with
intelligence services and politicians among America’s enemies. These are not
simply bearded provincials with rifles from the edge of the world. They are
well trained in political maneuvering, harbor no illusions about “permanent
friends,” and pursue one goal: the creation of an Islamic Afghan empire based
on Pashtun unity as a foundation for conservative Islamization across Central
and Middle Asia.
They are always ready to assist one group of
“infidels” against another and are not embarrassed to change sides quickly if
it becomes advantageous. In their view surrounding Islamic regimes are either
insufficiently Islamic or practice the wrong form of Islam. As long as these
regimes do not submit to Taliban authority, they cannot expect permanent
friendly relations from them.
The last major empire created by Afghans, the
Durrani Empire, included the entirety of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan
as well as parts of eastern Persia. Its northern frontier in Central Asia
roughly followed today’s line but remained fluid and never firmly fixed. The
Durrani Empire collapsed only in 1823. The historical memory of Pashtun unity
and Pashtun hegemony remains very much alive.
Taliban leaders understand perfectly well that none
of the great powers currently wishes to quarrel with them. Neighboring states,
even if they repel Taliban aggression, will likely be satisfied with that
outcome alone and will not invade core Afghan territory within internationally
recognized borders. Perhaps a small piece of land can even be seized from them.
Iran faces pressure from the United States and Israel. Pakistan maintains its
perpetual conflict with India. India itself maneuvers cautiously, on one side
avoiding one-sided dependence on the United States and on the other resisting
excessive strengthening of the Russian-Chinese bloc across Eurasia.
When the big players are busy settling their
accounts, the smaller ones naturally take the opportunity to move on whatever
lies poorly guarded.
It is entirely possible that the Taliban knew
roughly when Israel and the United States would strike Iran and therefore began
their conflict with Pakistan shortly beforehand. In truth the timing hardly
mattered. Everyone understood that the strikes were imminent. The first two
paragraphs of this article were written before the attacks on Iran began. The
rest was written afterward. The events themselves changed neither the argument
nor the structure of the text. For the Taliban it was not essential whether to
begin two days earlier or two days later.
The Taliban acted in accordance with their own
interests. At the same time the United States likely knew about their
intentions and quietly encouraged them where possible. A border war in Pakistan
beginning simultaneously with a major war in the Middle East seriously
complicates Chinese logistics. It disrupts the shortest route linking Chinese
projects in Africa through the Middle East and the southern seas.
The route through Central Asia, the Caspian, the
Caucasus, and Turkey is unreliable. Protected routes through Russia lead toward
Europe or around Europe. These paths are much longer in terms of connections
with Africa and contain their own narrow points in the Mediterranean and the
North Atlantic that remain vulnerable to Western pressure.
It could be argued that this situation would
increase China’s dependence on Russian raw materials. Two questions immediately
arise.
First, can Russia sharply increase extraction of
all required resources in order to satisfy China’s needs without harming its
own economy and without reducing supply to other buyers?
Second, who will provide China with markets for
finished products that would replace those in Africa?
Russia does not require the majority of the goods
and services that China sells across the African continent. Increased transport
distance would raise prices both for delivered raw materials and for Chinese
manufactured goods. Such changes would reduce the attractiveness of cooperation
for African states.
India has not yet spoken its final word. A recent
attempt to start a war with Pakistan ended with a catastrophic performance by
the Indian air force. Since then Delhi has attempted to correct the problems
revealed in that campaign. The work on mistakes is visible, though it is
unlikely that all problems have been solved. If Pakistan becomes entangled in a
serious conflict with the Taliban while China is preoccupied with supporting
Iran in its confrontation with the United States and Israel, India may perceive
an opportunity. A temptation may arise to settle the Pakistani problem and
significantly strengthen its own regional position, where it currently faces
China and Chinese partners along most of its strategic perimeter.
It would be fortunate if some conflicts quickly
burn out and others never begin. Experience suggests otherwise. A conflict
quickly extinguished in Asia can quickly flare up again. No one intends to
resolve the existing clusters of contradictions.
Meanwhile a larger war in Asia is beginning to
unfold. This time both Iran and the United States together with Israel appear
better prepared. Both sides seem ready for a longer and bloodier confrontation.
Time will show how events develop. Against the backdrop of a major war the
smaller local conflicts remain almost invisible. Few pay attention to them, yet
each contributes its share to the destabilization of the entire region.