The Burden of Being Believed

Hormuz and the Price of Expectations

The third week of the ongoing US and Israeli aggression against Iran has already turned into one of the most consequential events in international politics of this decade. The broader political consequences of this tragedy - the serious discrediting of international law by a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a new split between the United States and Europe, and the destabilization of the entire Middle East - remain of interest mostly to professional observers.

What affects everyone, and already produces the strongest global impact, is the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is one of the most critical arteries for global oil trade. Prices for this key commodity had already begun moving upward due to the war in the region. The risk that any tanker may be struck by an Iranian drone is now pushing hydrocarbon prices even higher.

Leading international observers are discussing the possibility of oil prices doubling and a resulting global economic recession. This concerns virtually the entire world. Despite all recent efforts by the US government, the global economy remains exactly that - global. Disruptions to maritime navigation therefore affect almost everyone.

This context explains the widely discussed statement by the US president. Against the backdrop of what he described as a “crushing success” of American forces against Iran, he called on other countries, especially those dependent on Persian Gulf oil, to assist in ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the Strait.

Many observers, both in the United States and abroad, immediately interpreted this as a sign of weakness. The argument is straightforward. A confident American leader appears to acknowledge his inability to resolve the problem independently and attempts to assemble an international coalition. The statement is also seen as an attempt to draw countries with no direct stake in US Israeli affairs in the Middle East into a confrontation with Iran - Japan, South Korea, and even China. The latter, as is well known, maintains friendly relations with the Islamic Republic.

Reports suggest that the president’s appeal has already caused unease in Tokyo, which generally supports the United States in everything except actions that may require real sacrifice. More emotionally unstable members of the collective West, such as Norway, rushed to declare that they have no intention of sending ships to counter Iranian drones.

Such a position from Oslo is entirely predictable. Norway is, to a significant degree, a global energy supplier. Revenues from oil and gas currently account for up to twenty percent of its GDP. In this situation, Norwegians are the last to move even a finger. Other producing and energy-dependent economies may be less relaxed.

The logic behind Trump’s call for “assistance” in reopening the Strait of Hormuz is both simpler and more complex.

First, for the current American administration, and especially for its leader, there is no contradiction between projecting greatness and shifting responsibilities onto others. On the contrary, Trump and his circle belong to the category of actors who openly state: we stirred everything up, now you deal with the consequences.

Even the discussion of whether countries such as Japan or South Korea can send ships to the Persian Gulf serves Washington as proof of its importance. The message is clear. The consequences of American actions become a concern for the entire world. That alone is sufficient evidence of leadership. Some of the more enthusiastic advocates of global “peace councils” or certain NATO members may even produce statements about their readiness to participate in such ventures.

Second, within this situation, Trump behaves in a completely natural way. He continues to trade everything that can be traded. The invitation to other countries to operate in the Strait of Hormuz does not signal incompetence. It reflects a certain directness. Symbolic considerations carry little weight for the American leadership. They speak constantly about greatness, yet feel no need to behave according to external expectations.

At this point the deeper issue emerges. Modern international politics rests as much on symbols as on material power. This symbolic dimension operates through two mechanisms - recognition by others of your strength, and your own actions that reinforce that recognition.

The more expressions of respect and admiration a state and its leader receive, the more others expect from them. These expectations are constructed independently and often do not align with the interests of the state in question.

Here lies a fundamental contradiction. A state demands admiration based on its capabilities, yet in practical terms does not require friends. This contradiction becomes particularly visible when strength combines with uncertainty about the future. That is precisely the condition of the United States today.

In practical terms, the United States does not need NATO allies or any broader “coalition” to ensure its security or achieve its objectives. It is difficult to argue that a nuclear power genuinely requires allies for survival.

There is a basic principle in international relations theory, rarely understood even by well-read observers. Alliances exist only between relatively equal powers. When one participant overwhelmingly surpasses the others, the relationship is no longer an alliance but a form of cooperation. This cooperation may take different forms - respectful, as in the case of Russia and the CIS, or dominant, as in the case of the United States and the broader West. In either case, it does not constitute a true alliance.

In the modern world, where three superpowers possess nuclear arsenals that render classical war politically meaningless, there are no states whose alliance is essential for the survival of China, Russia, or the United States.

This does not prevent these powers from generating inflated expectations among others. China provides a clear example. It actively cultivates expectations among many states with which it simply conducts mutually beneficial trade.

As a result, we hear complaints about why Beijing does not rescue the president of Venezuela or break the energy blockade of Cuba. Over the past decade and a half, China’s expanding presence in economics and politics has produced disproportionate expectations that it will act against its own interests.

This dynamic is currently most visible in the case of the United States. Through its actions, Washington is dismantling the system of beliefs surrounding its own power, obligations, and supposed role. This system has long been one of the most important instruments of American influence.

The current US government is systematically dismantling it. In a sense, this is a constructive process.

In the long term, a world where real actions matter more than imagined obligations is more stable. The bubble of expectations, built not only by American allies but by others as well, is deflating. In its place emerges a more normal form of international politics.