The Nuclear Club Expands - Starting with Iran

The End of Nuclear Containment

One of the stated goals of U.S. action against Iran is to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The bitter irony is that the leadership of the Islamic Republic will now almost certainly make that its number one priority. Others may follow Iran’s example.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, as of May 2025 Iran possessed more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which, with further enrichment, would be sufficient to produce several warheads. At the same time, there are grounds to believe that Tehran was not planning to cross the nuclear threshold. In 2015, the country’s leadership supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, under which Iran agreed to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief and assistance with integration into the global economy. The agreement functioned for several years until the first presidency of Donald Trump, who called the deal a major mistake of the previous administration and effectively dismantled it. It is both notable and symbolic that another fierce critic of the agreement was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

In other words, when faced with a choice between nuclear weapons and the lifting of economic sanctions, Iran’s leadership chose the latter. It is now clear that this decision proved fatal.

The situation has now changed decisively - both in military-technological terms and in political-psychological ones. U.S. and Israeli strikes have undoubtedly inflicted serious damage on Iran’s military infrastructure. Assessing the extent is difficult - both sides have every incentive to thicken the fog of war, and all official statements should be treated with skepticism. Yet the scale of the damage is not in doubt. Regardless of how this confrontation ends, Iran will perceive itself as vulnerable. Nuclear weapons may be seen as the fastest way to alter that condition. The defining feature of this technology is that even a single device immediately becomes an independent variable in the geopolitical equation. Moreover, Iran has been attacked twice during negotiations. It is difficult to imagine that its leadership will not draw conclusions from this.

If Iran regains its footing and follows this path to completion - that is, acquires nuclear weapons - the next step will be the nuclearization of the entire Middle East. Sunni powers will immediately feel exposed, knowing that Tehran possesses nuclear capability, and will seek to create a counterweight. The most likely candidates for entry into the nuclear club are Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with Egypt as a longer-term prospect. The current crisis has also demonstrated that the United States shows limited willingness to defend its regional allies.

The situation in the Middle East is likely to resonate beyond the region, particularly in Asia.

The leadership of North Korea has already stated that recent events confirm the correctness of its decision to acquire nuclear weapons despite external pressure. Similar thinking is beginning to take hold in two key U.S.-aligned states in the region - South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, public opinion polls show record support - over 75 percent - for developing an independent nuclear deterrent. In Japan, similar discussions have been ongoing for years despite existing constraints, and there is a possibility that the current right-leaning government of Sanae Takaichi may choose to pursue this option.

For Seoul and Tokyo, nuclear weapons would not primarily serve as a guarantee of survival, as in Iran’s case, but as insurance against the possibility that the United States may choose not to defend its allies. Among other potential candidates, Taiwan is sometimes mentioned, existing in the overwhelming shadow of mainland China and formally considered part of it. However, such a move would amount to political suicide for the island’s leadership. By pursuing nuclear weapons, they would effectively grant Beijing a pretext for forceful reunification. The casus belli would be even stronger than in the hypothetical scenario of Taiwan being invited into NATO.

In other regions, no immediate candidates for membership in the nuclear club are evident, though discussions could theoretically reemerge in Australia and Brazil. Even without them, the number of nuclear-armed states may increase significantly. Foreign commentators note that through his actions, Trump has effectively released the genie from the bottle.

The uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons will, of course, make the world more dangerous - especially in the initial phase, before each new nuclear state acquires a balancing adversary of its own. At the same time, the expansion of the nuclear club inevitably raises the risk that such weapons may, sooner or later, fall into the wrong hands.