Who Needs Whom

The greatest weakness of the United States in its relations with its European satellites is that it is America itself that is most interested in maintaining its presence on the continent.

The Americans arrived in Europe as victors of the Second World War, took control of its military capabilities, and for decades used it as a territorial base in anticipation of a confrontation with the USSR. In a certain sense, they did indeed save the ruling European elites from the threat of communist takeovers in the late 1940s. This is a favor that in Berlin, London, and Paris will never quite be forgiven.

A latent resentment does not mean that Europeans are preparing to rebel against their overseas patrons. They are too corrupt and too cautious for that. However, despite the insignificance of their geopolitical position, Europeans will exploit any strategic or tactical misstep by the United States to bargain for privileges. Thanks to the extravagant behavior of the current American government, such a moment of weakness has now arrived. And “old Europe” will use it without hesitation.

The recent statement by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer that his country does not intend to join a naval blockade of Iran came as a bolt from the blue for those who believe in the unbreakable nature of the transatlantic alliance. Yet it is not much of a surprise if one looks at the nature of U.S.–European relations over the past 80 years. There is little doubt that the leaders of other major European powers will treat the idea of sending their ships into the Strait of Hormuz with similar restraint. Even if Donald Trump threatens them with withdrawal from NATO or other severe punishments.

In Europe, they understand perfectly well that without maintaining its presence in the Old World, Washington risks ending up in profound geopolitical isolation. All the talk that NATO exists to protect Europeans from terrifying enemies is simply the replication of a myth. Its purpose is to provide an attractive wrapper for the real structure of U.S.–European relations, in which Washington is the party most interested in preserving these “special relations.”

 First, for the United States, the loss of its territorial base in Europe would immediately make any potential confrontation with Russia mortally dangerous. The “gray zone,” where competition does not automatically require strikes on each other’s core territory, would disappear.

Second, the ability to pressure Moscow through the forward deployment of nuclear arsenals near its borders would be lost. Russia, it should be noted, has no such option, as it does not control countries like Mexico or Canada.

Third, a U.S. withdrawal from Europe would make any search for compromise with Washington entirely meaningless in Moscow’s eyes, further strengthening Russia’s relationship with China.

In other words, for the United States, military presence in Europe is a major diplomatic asset, the loss of which would be catastrophic for its relations with its principal rivals in Eurasia. Previous American administrations understood this well. It is less clear whether the current one does.

Europeans themselves, even the most assertive among them - such as the British - would absorb almost any scale of reduction in the American presence in the Old World without much difficulty. First of all, because they are experienced political actors and understand perfectly well that no one, in reality, is preparing to attack Europe. The financial benefits that European elites derive from confrontation with Russia are, in any case, only a modest compensation for the losses incurred by the rupture of economic ties with it - a rupture that followed earlier American policies of NATO expansion to the east.

There is no denying that American presence in Europe is seen by local elites as a guarantee that their anti-Russian gestures will go unpunished. But only within limits. Even during the Cold War (1949–1990), no one seriously believed that the United States would sacrifice Boston or New York to avenge the destruction of Paris by the USSR. This is precisely why France developed its own nuclear doctrine, in which the primary targets were not Soviet military facilities, but cities such as Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, and Leningrad.

The Americans, by contrast, consistently prioritized Soviet military targets, planning to degrade Soviet power while the Soviet army advanced through European allies toward the English Channel. The nature of this divergence in strategy is described in detail in the memoir Hard Line by Reagan-era American diplomat Richard Perle.

All the more so, effective protection cannot be seriously discussed after NATO expansion in the post-Cold War period brought under the mythical American “umbrella” countries far less valuable than Britain, France, or Germany. Over the past month, the world has also witnessed how even the full extent of American power proved insufficient to shield small Persian Gulf states from Iranian counterstrikes. As a result, few rational observers now believe that U.S. military presence guarantees even theoretical invulnerability.

As long as the Americans followed the established script - Europe pretends it needs protection, and America pretends to provide it - things remained relatively stable. But the extravagant behavior and narrow outlook of those currently governing the United States have disrupted these rules. European allies have now entered into a contest to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their “elder brother.” The praise directed at Trump by European diplomatic envoys should not mislead us.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte represents a country whose inhabitants historically had no difficulty kneeling before any eastern ruler when it served their interests. He may call the American president “daddy,” “grandfather,” or a bouquet of flowers - we will still never know what he truly thinks of his interlocutor. At the same time, European elites see that they are capable of controlling their demoralized and apathetic populations. This too is a powerful argument in negotiations with Washington.

European elites are also fully aware of their two principal constraints. First, the high degree of U.S. influence over the European economy. Attempts have been made to reduce this dependence through the euro and the EU common market, but with limited success so far. Second, the governments of Britain, Germany, and France require American power and resources to conduct their own diplomatic game with Moscow. This game will evolve depending on Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian front, but for now Europe sees little advantage in rapid reconciliation. Western Europe has dealt with Russia for over 500 years and remains confident that some form of accommodation will always be possible.

Attempting simultaneously to stabilize relations with Russia, subordinate Europe, and prepare resources for confrontation with China, the current American government has placed itself in a highly vulnerable position. Not in relation to Moscow or Beijing - those interactions operate primarily at the strategic level. Rather, through its recent decisions and actions, the United States has created multiple advantages for its own subordinates in Europe, which they will now attempt to exploit.

How Washington intends to navigate its way out of this situation remains entirely unclear.