TRUMP, IRAN, AND THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL

As the previous post was being published, American warplanes were already moving into strike positions near Iran's nuclear facilities. Yet nothing has changed strategically. The possibility of a direct U.S. entry into the conflict was discussed in the prior analysis – with the hope that it would not happen  - precisely because it was already evident that Israel could no longer wait - and that the deadlines may have been set deliberately to distract.

What has changed, fundamentally, is that the U.S. has passed the bifurcation point: the moment when it could still decide whether to enter the war directly or leave Israel to face the consequences alone. Washington opted to strike, calculating that a catastrophic Israeli defeat would be too costly. The U.S. now needs to exit this crisis quickly, preserving face for itself and for Israel - ideally, with a headline-grabbing "victory" over Iran's nuclear program.

Trump immediately encountered domestic political turbulence. Data indicating strong voter opposition to a war with Iran was no secret. Chuck Schumer, Senate Minority Leader and a Democrat with a support base that includes significant migrant and Islamist-leaning communities, demanded that Trump justify dragging the U.S. into an undeclared war without congressional approval.

Trump's Republican majority in the Senate is precarious, and there are plenty of intra-party opponents. Even in the House, where Republicans hold a stronger grip, reactions remain unpredictable. Critics accuse Trump of usurping Congress's constitutional war powers.

Of course, this isn’t the first time a president has done so. Reagan bypassed Congress in the invasion of Grenada; subsequent administrations did the same in Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. U.S. combat operations have long blurred the line between war and "intervention."

But this time the stakes are higher. A global war is no longer unimaginable. Nobody knows how far Russia or China might go in backing Iran. Dmitry Medvedev has hinted that Iran could receive nuclear materials or even weapons from a "third party." Medvedev, playing the "bad cop" to Putin's more restrained tone, is still part of a coordinated act. And China's pre-strike rhetoric was already unusually harsh by Beijing’s standards.

Trump had little choice but to strike - or at least, he believed he didn’t. Now, the task is to exit the crisis without destabilizing fallout. The White House quickly insisted that this is not a war, that no further strikes are planned, and that Iran should not retaliate - because if it does, the U.S. will be "forced" to respond again.

Iran has responded, though in limited form: floating the idea of closing the Strait of Hormuz (a serious move), declaring all U.S. personnel in the region legitimate targets (largely symbolic), and intensifying attacks on Israel (strategically significant). Israel remains the linchpin of this crisis. If its defenses collapse, the perception of U.S. power collapses with them.

Iran understands that refraining from attacking U.S. assets allows Trump to portray himself as a master strategist who brought Iran to its knees. But the temptation to disrupt this narrative is strong.

And yet, things aren’t so simple. An Iranian counterstrike could, paradoxically, strengthen Trump domestically by casting the U.S. as the victim. Tehran can’t predict whether retaliation will weaken or empower Trump. So, its decision-making must weigh three core considerations:

• What strengthens the internal political balance within Iran: a defiant escalation or a show of restraint?
• What improves Iran’s standing among regional allies and rivals?
• What do consultations with Russia and China suggest?

Iran’s foreign minister is due in Moscow today. Chinese-Iranian backchannel consultations have been ongoing since the conflict began. China is likely to take a more radical position than Russia - but how far will either go?

Would Russia go beyond diplomatic protests? Would China offer covert weapons, issue a public pledge of support, or even participate in a limited engagement?

Iran’s ultimate decision will be shaped by domestic politics. A government under attack must show public strength. But confidence in sustained foreign support is also essential.

In the end, Trump has escalated less skillfully than Biden, whose approach was often dismissed as senile but remained risk-averse. The problem isn’t the risk itself; it’s that Trump has outsourced the resolution of a major war to Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing.

The direction of the crisis now hinges not on Washington, but on how these three capitals interpret their interests. Whatever happens next will be because they decided it should.

Losing control of events is a fatal flaw in statecraft. Trump has lost control. He can no longer predict - let alone shape - the trajectory of the conflict. He can only hope Iran, Russia, or China make a mistake. But hoping for your opponent’s error is not a strategy. It’s a prelude to catastrophe.

You don’t win by gambling on luck. You win by mastering events. And right now, the crisis is running America - not the other way around.