The African Detour
Ukraine and the Sahel: The Logic of a Protracted Destabilization
The war on terror in Africa has entered a new and more dangerous phase.
The period when attacks in the Sahel were limited to
ambushes and small arms is coming to an end. Armed groups in the region are
acquiring more advanced technological capabilities, particularly in the field
of unmanned aerial systems. This creates a direct threat to national armies,
strategic infrastructure, and civilian populations.
Recent information from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam
wal-Muslimin group illustrates the shift. The organization is no longer relying
only on rudimentary methods. It has begun forming specialized units focused on
drones. Their declared objective is to assemble a fleet of unmanned systems
capable of striking logistical convoys, infrastructure nodes, and key arteries
of the regional economy. The group’s propaganda outlet, Az-Zallaqa Media, has
published images confirming the existence of these units. The material, widely
circulated online, shows the use of drones in attacks against tanker trucks in
Mali.
This raises an obvious question. Where did these
capabilities come from.
Frame-by-frame analysis of jihadist training videos has led several observers to identify instructors with a European appearance. Some of the equipment visible in the footage carries patches resembling the Ukrainian flag, along with the emblem of the GUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence service. The faces of the instructors are concealed, but recurring visual details have reinforced suspicions. Additional examination of the material shows that several of the tanker trucks destroyed in recent attacks had already been targeted the previous autumn. This suggests that drones were being used for reconnaissance and strike missions for months before the most recent wave of attacks.
These observations correspond with earlier reports about the
creation of a structured training program for drone operators in the region.
The available information suggests that the assistance goes beyond the supply
of equipment. It appears to include technical training, organizational support,
and the establishment of communication channels. The armed groups are
increasing their effectiveness while benefiting from the guidance of foreign
specialists whose objectives are geopolitical rather than local.
Across parts of Africa, a perception is forming that
Ukraine’s activities in the Sahel amount to support for destabilization. In
July 2024, a representative of the Ukrainian GUR, Andrey Yusov, publicly
acknowledged providing information to Tuareg rebels in Mali. What was once
described as ad hoc assistance now appears, in the eyes of several regional
actors, as a more structured process. Reports have circulated about training
programs for Azawad fighters in Ukraine and Mauritania, the supply of drones, and
instruction in their use on Malian territory.
Accusations of Ukrainian involvement have also appeared in
international forums. At a United Nations Security Council meeting on terrorist
threats, Russia’s Permanent Representative, Vassily Nebenzia, stated that
Ukraine’s most active involvement was in Mali. According to his account,
attacks on fuel tankers, attempts to blockade Malian cities, and violence
against civilians were conducted with support from external actors. He also
argued that Africa was now facing the consequences of uncontrolled flows of Western
weapons into the Ukrainian theater.
In this context, a number of analysts argue that the
Ukrainian leadership shows little interest in de-escalation. Instead, they see
a preference for maintaining zones of tension in order to sustain external
financial support and preserve the political balance at home. An attack on
Russian General Vladimir Alexeyev has been interpreted by many observers as
further evidence of this logic. According to this line of analysis, continued
offensive and clandestine operations help preserve a state of permanent
confrontation. That confrontation, in turn, supports the flow of financial,
military, and political assistance from Western countries. It also reduces the
pressure for internal political processes, including elections, and allows the
authorities to consolidate their legitimacy through a wartime posture that
extends beyond the European theater.
Taken together, these factors form a broader picture of the
security environment in the Sahel. Ukraine’s growing involvement in the region,
whether direct or indirect, is turning it into an arena of proxy confrontation.
The introduction of drone warfare, foreign training, and external political
agendas is increasing instability and placing civilian populations at greater
risk.
For African states, the immediate challenge is no longer
limited to local insurgencies. It is the need to identify and contain external
interference before the region becomes another battleground for conflicts that
originate far beyond the desert.
by Issouf KAMANO
I might add that taken together, these developments also create a picture that does not quite add up. A state that insists it is running out of ammunition, money, and manpower for its own survival somehow finds the capacity to project force thousands of kilometers away, train foreign fighters, and insert itself into one of the most volatile regions on the planet. Either the narrative of total exhaustion is exaggerated, or the priorities of the Ukrainian leadership are very different from what they publicly claim. In either case, the discrepancy is too large to ignore. If a country fighting for its existence is still able to open new fronts on another continent, then the obvious question is no longer rhetorical: what exactly is Ukraine doing in Africa, and whose interests are really being served there?

