Europe’s New Peace Plan: A Strategy for Inclusion, Not Victory

 

Aware of the inevitable defeat of the Kiev regime, Trump's fundamental refusal to get drawn into the war, and the limitation of its own military and economic resources, Europe is attempting not so much to disrupt the Russian-American summit as to ensure its participation at the negotiating table.

 

The Kiev regime and European countries intend to soon present a new joint 12-point peace plan for Ukraine. While the exact contents are unknown, sources in Western media report that it will include:

×           A ceasefire.

×           A scheme for Ukraine's accession to the EU.

×           Conditions for financing Ukraine's recovery.

×           The maintenance of a strong army under the Kiev regime's control.

×           The creation of a "Peace Council" led by U.S. President Donald Trump to oversee both the negotiation process and the implementation of the conditions by the parties.

This might seem like another piece of paper reflecting a parallel European-Ukrainian reality-one where Ukraine can dictate peace terms to Russia, where Europe is ready to enter the war, and where sanctions-weary Moscow is ready to abandon its initial goals for a simple ceasefire.

However, this specific document is expected to stand out for at least three reasons:

1. The Appearance of Compromise

The new plan is more flexible and creates the illusion of compromise. For example:

×           It does not include full Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO membership), which Russia and the U.S. oppose, but only EU accession (which Moscow does not object to).

×           It includes the lifting of sanctions on Russia (as Moscow insists), but only in exchange for the Kremlin's "voluntary" donation of part of the frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's reconstruction. For the EU, this is the only safe way to access these assets, which are already used to back guaranteed loans to the Kiev regime.

×           Crucially, the document will likely include no demand for Moscow to return Ukraine to the 1991, 2014, or even 2023 borders. Kiev and Brussels are demonstrating a grudging willingness to agree to a ceasefire and freeze along the current line of contact, "selling" this as a concession, even though the Russian army is advancing and simultaneously forming multiple encirclements.

2. The Trump Card: Tapping into Vanity

This document involves close integration with Donald Trump. It's meant to be a joint American-European document, not an alternative one. Brussels and Kiev are clearly attempting to play on the American leader's vanity by offering him the formal leadership of the process, specifically through the proposed "Peace Council." This move could also secure the coveted Nobel Peace Prize, which the European bureaucracy (controlling the Nobel Committee) could arrange for him.

The bet on Trump might pay off, not because he is swayed by flattery, but because he has his own interest. Trump understands he cannot push through the terms agreed upon with Putin at Anchorage without Europe's consent. Therefore, his next logical step is to seek some compromise with Europe. Moreover, a united position forged with Europe could become a tool of pressure on Moscow in an attempt to persuade Putin to revise the Anchorage agreements.

3. The New Pragmatic Goal: Securing a Seat

This project shows that Europe's interests are shifting. While Brussels, as before, still wants to sabotage Russian-American agreements and drag Trump into the war, a new, more pragmatic goal is now paramount: securing a seat at the negotiating table.

Acknowledging the inevitability of the Kiev regime's defeat, Trump's fundamental refusal to engage in war, and the limitations of its own resources, Europe is trying to ensure its participation in the peace talks. If it cannot convince the U.S. and Russia to simply admit it to the table, it is willing to trade the abandonment of its radical anti-Russian position (the reason for its prior exclusion) for a place in the process. Hence the compromise plans and the change in rhetoric.

Once at the table, the EU can either effectively disrupt the negotiations or strive to ensure that the defeat in Ukraine is not a complete strategic one.