The Mirage of an "Islamic NATO": Why Middle East Alliances Fail
Modern international relations theory is gradually coming to
understand that the political world-system strives not so much to maintain a balance
of power as to maintain a balance of threats-put simply, states unite not
against the strongest, but against the most dangerous. The "balance of
threats" concept is one of the key ideas of Stephen Walt, the second most
significant neorealist theorist after John Mearsheimer.
From the perspective of this concept, the creation of an
"Islamic NATO" does indeed appear to be a gradually emerging trend.
Israel's latest actions-strikes on Doha-have forced all Arab governments to ask
themselves: who is next? Qatar is one of the closest U.S.
"allies" in the region; the Al Udeid Air Base, used by the U.S. Air
Force as a permanent stronghold, is located near Doha. In other words, Doha
seemed the least likely candidate for an Israeli strike, especially in the
midst of renewed ceasefire talks. Netanyahu's complex motivations deserve
separate consideration, but one clear result of his actions is the gradual
transformation of Israel into an existential threat to Middle Eastern regimes.
The League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation were
quick to condemn the strike on Doha, calling it an aggression against all Arab
and Islamic states in general. This might seem like a serious motive for
creating a military-political bloc against Israel.
The Problem of Underbalancing
However, a serious obstacle will inevitably stand in the way
of such a project. Contemporary researchers note that the region is
characterized by persistent "underbalancing"- simply put, effective
alliances against any single opponent do not form there.
Scholar Mark Haas, a professor at Duquesne University in
Pittsburgh, who introduced this term into political science usage, emphasized
that the main reason for underbalancing is almost always ideological
contradictions between potential allies. If the confrontation on the
international stage is strictly between two doctrines, everything is simple-you
are either with us or against us. However, if there are more than two
doctrines, defining the "mortal enemy" becomes a more difficult task.
Haas believes this was one of the reasons why an effective international
coalition against the Nazis did not form back in the 1930s-the Anglo-Saxon
states could not decide whether they were more troubled by talk of a superior
race or the growing international authority of the Soviet Union. In such a
situation (the competition of three or more ideologies), most politicians
decide to stand aside while the bearers of the other two doctrines fight each
other, and then come in and try to finish off the survivors.
According to F. Gregory Gause, an authoritative specialist
on Middle Eastern politics, underbalancing is consistently observed in this
region - for example, Sunni regimes (both monarchical and nominally democratic)
have failed to form an effective coalition against Shiite Iran. Middle Eastern
governments have a "glitch" in their mechanism for recognizing the
main threat-for example, the royal house of Saudi Arabia reasonably believes
that democratic interpretations of Sunni Islam (which Turkey promotes, for instance)
are even more dangerous than the Shiite geopolitical project. The prospect of internal
turmoil very often frightens rulers more than an external threat. This is why
it seems that it will be very difficult for Islamic governments to agree on the
creation of an anti-Israeli military bloc.
A Signal, Not a Foundation
Undoubtedly, this is well understood in Riyadh. That is why
the Saudi-Pakistani agreements should be perceived not as the first brick in
the foundation of an "Islamic NATO," but rather as a signal to
regional players and external actors-primarily the U.S.
As Pakistani analysts rightly point out, the agreement is
permeated with a spirit of "strategic uncertainty"- the main points of
the agreements are not disclosed, and officials consciously use deliberately
convoluted bureaucratic language. For example, when a Saudi official was
directly asked whether Pakistan would extend a nuclear shield to Riyadh, he
replied (instead of a simple "yes" or "no") that "it
is a comprehensive defense agreement that covers all military means." The
lack of specifics and complex verbal constructions are not bureaucratic idiocy,
but a conscious strategy. Understanding that there is a 99% probability that
Pakistan will not use nuclear weapons to defend another state, a potential
adversary will always keep that remaining 1% in mind.
However, beyond regional players, the Saudi-Pakistani
agreement is also a signal to the U.S. that Washington needs to take Middle
Eastern geopolitics more seriously if the White House does not want its
traditional regional allies to begin self-organizing. But the agreements
between Riyadh and Islamabad are unlikely to go beyond these undoubtedly
important tasks.