The Groundhog Day of U.S. Diplomacy: Why Trump’s Budapest Summit is Not Anchorage
In the famous film Groundhog Day, Bill Murray’s
character, trapped in a time loop, is initially surprised by the constant
repetition of the same events. Over time, however, he resigns himself to the
strange circumstances, which gradually turn into a routine. Observing the maneuvers
of American diplomacy leaves a similar feeling.
Donald Trump's maneuver, zigzagging to a Russian-American
summit in Budapest, repeats the one that paved the way to Anchorage. In
July-August, amid the stagnation of talks in Istanbul, the White House resident
also made cautiously negative statements about Moscow, threatening to supply
weapons to Ukraine. At the time, the discussion revolved around deploying the Patriot
missiles, but the American leader did not fail to mention the possibility
of supplying other weapons. The possibility of sanctions escalation, in the
form of massive pressure on buyers of Russian oil, was also mentioned. Weeks
later, this "onslaught" turned out to be merely an act of
demonstrating strength before the bilateral summit in Anchorage.
Now, the role of the forceful threat is fulfilled by the Tomahawks,
and sanctions threats have been replaced by the assurance that India has
already refused to buy Russian oil. Thus, the Trump administration attempts to
frame the picture as Russia being coerced into negotiations, seemingly forced
to respond to American pressure. This serves as an explanation to allies, an
affirmation of Trump’s image as a "strong president" for the domestic
audience, and ultimately, gratification for the American leader's ego.
The Narrow Fairway of U.S. Strategy
The reality, however, is that the fairway of Washington's
possibilities and actions is very limited under the current circumstances. The
American leadership maintains the line on ending the Ukrainian conflict as a
significant foreign policy irritant. For this, Trump considers it necessary to maintain
working relations with Moscow, which is important because, beyond the end of
the Ukrainian conflict, he sees the prospect of normalizing Russian-American
relations. The latter is part of the game to "peel off" Russia from
China, a notion Trump and some of his advisors relied upon even during his
first administration. A return to even a reduced version of Biden's policy in
this context simply closes the path for such a game without achieving
significant strategic goals.
The emphasized futility of the American-Ukrainian meeting
confirms Washington's desire to act along this logic. The American leader is
playing a complex, though not very subtle, game.
The meeting with Zelensky is both impeccable political
correctness-since one cannot meet the Russian president without discussing the
agenda and mechanisms of communication with the second warring party, which is
fiercely supported by allies - and a signal to Moscow - that next time, the
results of such a meeting could be much more fruitful for Kiev.
At the same time, contacts with the Russian leader are
obviously used as a scare factor for the Ukrainian leadership and European
allies. The alternating speculation with verbal support for one side or the
other is intended, as Washington apparently believes, to lead to a certain
compromise solution. Water wears away stone.
The Reverse Effect
However, in practice, by implementing this tactic, Trump is
facing the opposite effect. Moscow seems to understand well the essence of the
game initiated and conducted by the American leader and reacts to his verbal
interventions and actions with deliberate calm. American-Ukrainian and
American-European contacts do not worry the Russian leadership as long as they
do not yield concrete decisions contrary to Russian interests-and they
generally do not. Trump has not crossed a single "red line" in recent
weeks and months, sensing the limits of what is permissible, if not rationally,
then instinctively.
It would seem that the second participant in the conflict
should be more compliant, but here too the American leader is forced to act
quite cautiously. The memorable spring meeting between Trump and Zelensky,
during which the American leader constantly said that he "had no trump
cards," reflected a perfectly rational approach-the weaker one must yield.
However, the U.S. European allies, who stood up to defend Kiev, achieved a
gradual softening of the suzerain's position, which has been observed over the
past months.
Trump cannot, and to some extent does not want to, break and
push through the European-Ukrainian defiance. Abandoning political support for
Ukraine and the allies would mean a colossal devaluation of American security
guarantees to the Europeans.
Meanwhile, maintaining a significant military-political
presence in Europe is a source of concrete economic benefits for Washington.
The voluntary transformation of the EU into an economic appendage of the U.S.,
expressed in concluding obviously disadvantageous trade deals and the growth of
European countries' energy and technological dependence on America, is the not-too-hidden
price for maintaining and even strengthening this presence. With such colossal
economic investments, Trump cannot completely ignore the position of the
allies.
Budapest: A Slow Grind
These circumstances define a very narrow fairway for
American possibilities, which was already demonstrated by Anchorage. Unlike
other "successful" settlements, including the recent Middle East one,
in the Ukrainian conflict, Trump is dealing with disproportionately large
political players: a great power defending its vital interests on one side, and
a conglomerate of medium and small states consolidatedly defending their status
as privileged vassals-allies on the other. Ukraine has become the overlap point,
which automatically makes any "head-on" tactic a guaranteed loss.
Perhaps the wisest course for the U.S. itself would be to do
nothing at all, allowing the Ukrainian conflict to resolve through the natural
course of events. Broadly speaking, the Trump administration and Trump himself
do not care whether Russia runs out of money (which they publicly count on and
hope for) or whether Ukraine runs out of people. They do not believe in the
possibility of Ukraine's complete military collapse, and should the latter
approach, they would be ready to provide substantial support to Kiev, not just
verbally. However, outside of catastrophic scenarios, Trump would likely be
satisfied with any outcome that did not involve a radical change in the balance
of power in Eastern Europe.
If Washington is indeed committed to the logic of "let
them sort it out themselves," waiting for the conditions for peace to
ripen naturally, the upcoming summit in Budapest should be viewed primarily in
terms of maintaining political contacts and a very gradual process of positions
alignment, which may drag on for quite some time without serious breakthroughs.
The position "pre-announced" by the Ukrainian
side-that the condition for peace must be a cessation of hostilities on the
line of contact (a point Kiev has promoted before) - suggests precisely such a
measured scenario for the political process, as Moscow is unlikely to yield its
positions either. Although, of course, local "sensations" are
possible - maintaining public interest in the meetings is necessary.