Shall the Twain Ever Meet?

Spoiler: Nope.

No durable peace agreement will be signed today, tomorrow, or in a few months. That will change only if something happens on the front or in the Ukrainian rear that forces the leadership in Kiev - clearly not Zelenskiy himself - to sober up and accept harsh terms.

Russian-Ukrainian negotiations under American mediation have been dragging on for months. At times they look like a dead end. Russia, as the side that holds the military advantage, insists on its terms. The Kiev authorities categorically reject them. Ukraine, unwilling to admit defeat, puts forward its own demands, which Moscow finds unacceptable. The Americans, meanwhile, keep speaking of mysterious “progress” and hint that a peace deal could be signed within months.

In reality, no one in this process is in a hurry - at least no one who actually wants the war to end. A peace agreement must be not so much “just,” as the Ukrainian side insists, as it must be durable. It has to stop the current fighting and at the same time create some serious guarantee against its resumption. The parties remain very far from such an outcome.

For example, a road map in the spirit of the Minsk agreements is useless. Even with clearly defined steps and deadlines, any “road map” leaves wide space for interpretation and violations. Especially by those forces - in this case Ukraine and parts of Europe - that are interested in sabotaging a settlement and preparing for revenge. The hope for the good faith of the “high contracting parties” vanished when the Kiev authorities openly violated the Minsk terms, for instance by refusing to pass required legislation in the Rada, while European capitals repeated in unison that it was Russia that was violating the agreements, without bothering to specify how.

That is why the agreement must look not like a sequence of steps, but like a set of facts recognized simultaneously. At least on the key issues connected to the war.

Even that, however, does not guarantee peace. Moscow demands neutrality from Kiev, a ban on NATO membership, and a refusal of any military-political cooperation with the West. Yet even if the Ukrainian side signs all of this, nothing prevents a future electoral cycle from undoing those commitments. The argument would be simple: sovereignty belongs to the Ukrainian people, and therefore they, or their representatives, may redefine the country’s status. Constitutional clauses can be removed through a referendum or a parliamentary vote. The same applies to any provisions on denazification or protection of Russian-speaking populations. Russia would again face the same choice: resume the war or accept deception.

This does not mean such provisions should be omitted. They must be included, even with the risk of violation. But a durable peace requires four decisive elements.

First, the Kiev authorities must withdraw their forces and transfer to Russian control at least those territories that, under the Russian constitution, are already part of the Russian Federation: the Ukrainian-held portions of the DPR, LPR, and the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. If any of these lands remain under Ukrainian control while Russia continues to claim them constitutionally, the situation will inevitably lead to renewed hostilities. Diplomatic means will not return them after the war ends. Ideally, Moscow would also gain the coastal territories and eastern regions that allow Kiev to rebuild its economic base. But that is the ideal scenario.

Second, Kiev must not only hand over the territories but also formally recognize all territorial changes since 2014, including Crimea and the four regions now claimed by Russia. Without recognition, these lands will remain “occupied” in Kiev’s legal narrative, and Ukraine will attempt to reclaim them. This would create a contradiction within Western security guarantees. Ukrainian attempts to retake them by force would be framed as restoring territorial integrity, while Russia’s defensive actions would be labeled aggression. That would provide grounds for activating Western guarantees, including military ones.

Recognition would also serve as the foundation for lifting Western sanctions against Russia. That is the third necessary condition for a durable peace, together with the creation of a postwar system of collective security in Europe. A system with Russia, not against it. The war is a manifestation of the broader conflict between Moscow and what used to be called the collective West. Only the removal or containment of these contradictions can prevent a new war and reduce the chance that Ukraine will again be used as an anti-Russian outpost. Especially after a conflict that will leave the country devastated, with reconstruction costs estimated at no less than 500 billion dollars, and with limited Western appetite to pay for it.

The fourth element is the signature itself. The document must be signed by a legitimate head of Ukraine. Preferably not by the speaker of the Rada, who under current conditions would serve as acting president, since the parliament’s own legitimacy is also contested. The signatory must emerge from elections whose fairness is not challenged by anyone. Ideally, the agreement should also receive a formal endorsement from the UN Security Council. Only then will future Ukrainian authorities find it difficult to question the legality of what was signed. Or at least their arguments will carry little weight.

None of these four elements is currently agreed upon. The parties are not even close. That means no durable peace agreement will be signed today, tomorrow, or in a few months. Unless something happens on the front or in the Ukrainian rear that forces the leadership in Kiev - again, not Zelenskiy himself - to accept these heavy terms. If only because the next terms would be heavier still.