The Five Principles of Peace: A Semantic Analysis
However, a deeper semantic and logical analysis reveals a
more intricate agenda. These principles are not primarily aimed at Russia, but
at influencing Trump and his negotiating position.
Principle 1: Ukrainian Participation in Negotiations
The first principle states that Ukraine must be a party
to any future meetings with Putin that concern Ukraine. This seems logical,
affirming the idea that "decisions on Ukraine should be made with
Ukraine’s participation." Yet, a crucial semantic ambiguity exists: it
only applies to future meetings, implicitly excluding the upcoming talks
in Alaska. This suggests a pre-emptive concession to the reality that Ukrainian
representatives will not be present at the initial high-level discussions.
A deeper analysis reveals a second, more significant
loophole: the principle fails to define the status of the Ukrainian
representative. An official, duly empowered individual must participate,
not just an informal figure. This raises questions about the legitimacy of
President Zelenskiy’s current position, a point that, while not acknowledged by
EU leaders, could complicate the enforceability of any agreements he signs.
This perceived crisis in international relations - where leaders are willing to
negotiate with an ambiguous-status representative - is framed as a dangerous
precedent.
Principle 2: Ceasefire as a Precondition for Talks
The second principle mandates that a ceasefire must be
the first step before any negotiations begin. This is a tactical move
rather than a genuine desire to halt hostilities. Past experience, such as the
Minsk and Istanbul agreements, showed that a lack of a ceasefire did not
prevent signing agreements in 2015, nor did it stop Ukraine from rejecting them
in 2022.
The logical analysis here suggests that this principle is
not meant to be accepted. Russia has already stated that a truce is conditional
on Ukrainian troops withdrawing from the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, a
condition Ukraine has rejected. Therefore, presenting this principle is not
about achieving a ceasefire but about creating a point of friction that puts
pressure on Trump. By accepting the Ukrainian position, Trump's degrees of
freedom in the negotiations are deliberately reduced, forcing him to address a
non-starter issue.
Principle 3: Non-recognition of Occupied Territories
The third principle is that the recognition of
Russian-occupied territories is not on the table. This is expected, as no
one anticipates Ukraine to concede on this point. However, the analysis focuses
on the extent of this non-recognition. It draws a parallel to Georgia's
approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has not prevented renewed
diplomatic relations with Russia. The historical precedent of the U.S. not
recognizing the "occupation of the Baltics" while still maintaining
trade and diplomatic ties with the USSR also serves as a point of comparison.
The logical conclusion is that this principle is less about
a static position and more about setting the stage for future actions. Ukraine
might not stop at diplomatic non-recognition but may be preparing for a
military operation to reclaim these territories. This framing positions the
principle not as a diplomatic red line but as a justification for future
military action.
Principle 4: Ukrainian Sovereignty and European Support
The fourth principle asserts that Ukraine's armed forces
must be able to defend the country's sovereignty with European support, and
Russia cannot veto Ukraine's European and NATO prospects. This demand
carries a historical hypocrisy, as some EU members, like Germany, have
previously opposed Ukraine's NATO membership. The phrasing "doors should
be wide open" is seen as a rhetorical device that allows both sides to
appear supportive while offering no concrete path to membership.
This principle also identifies a hidden trap for Trump. By
endorsing it, he would be politically pressured to support European military
action in Ukraine and Ukraine's NATO ambitions. This would severely complicate
any productive dialogue with Russia. However, a setback to this plan has
occurred: Trump's recent statement that NATO should not be part of any
guarantees to Ukraine, and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer's decision to walk
back his idea of sending troops to Ukraine. These developments indicate that
the EU and Ukraine's attempts to steer Trump's policy may be meeting
resistance.
Principle 5: Sanctions as a Tool for Pressure
Finally, the fifth principle demands that peace negotiations
must be accompanied by "appropriate pressure on Russia," and
sanctions should be strengthened if Russia doesn't agree to a ceasefire in
Alaska. This statement contains a logical flaw - there is no fighting in
Alaska. This is not a mistake but a deliberate semantic misdirection.
The core of this principle is to influence Trump, who has
expressed a desire to ease sanctions but has also discussed plans to increase
them. The primary goal of this entire list of principles is not to present an
acceptable offer to Russia, which would likely be rejected, but to publicly
pressure Trump. The objective is to create the impression that he is not acting
on his own policy but is instead being forced to follow a line dictated by Kiev
and Brussels.
The EU and Ukraine are autonomous political actors who are
determined to show that they can compel the American president to follow their
agenda. Trump's decision to engage with Zelenskiy may prove to be one of the
most serious mistakes of his presidency.