For the umpteenth time, the White House is leaking that
"Trump is considering ending diplomatic efforts to resolve the Ukrainian
crisis until the parties are ready to be more flexible."
Although the statement mentions "the parties," the
message is aimed at the Europeans. First, Russia has already "shown
flexibility" in Alaska, while Zelenskiy and his European entourage at the
White House have torpedoed all of Trump's initiatives.
Second, these hints about a potential U.S. withdrawal from
the Ukrainian peace process have been accompanied by Trump's own statements
that he may or may not impose additional sanctions on Russia - he hasn't
decided yet - and that he may impose sanctions on both Russia and Ukraine.
This marks a serious shift in the White House's position.
Until now, Ukraine has been seen exclusively as a victim that needs help, while
all responsibility for the failure of peace talks has been systematically
placed on Russia. If the U.S. once unequivocally supported the Ukrainian
position, demanding unilateral concessions from Russia, Trump is now stating
that the path to compromise requires mutual concessions. The Ukrainians and
Europeans are also complaining that the U.S. president supports Russia's demand
for the withdrawal of Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) from all territories that
became part of Russia since 2014.
The withdrawal of AFU from Donbass is only the first step,
to be followed by a ceasefire and negotiations on a territorial exchange. This
is the "Trump plan," which Kiev and the Europeans have rejected.
Initially, Zelenskiy and his team tried to push for a territorial exchange on a
"one inch for one inch" basis. Given that Russia controls less
territory in the Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and Sumy regions than Ukraine does in
Zaporozhye and Kherson, adopting such a format would have allowed Kiev to get
away with only ceding the left-bank territories of the Zaporozhye region (in
addition to the DPR/LPR and the territories of the Zaporozhye and Kherson
regions already under Russian control).
It’s clear that such a "compromise" was
unacceptable to Russia, but Zelenskiy and his supporters hoped they could
persuade Trump to agree to their formula, after which they were prepared to
blame Russia for derailing the peace process. However, Trump did not give in,
just as he ignored Zelenskiy's demand for an immediate bilateral meeting
between the Ukrainian and Russian presidents, a move also made in the hope of
consolidated Western support, a refusal from Putin, and a subsequent accusation
that Russia was unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.
A House Divided
Following the Euro-Ukrainian meeting with Trump, all of Kiev's
provocative initiatives were rejected, leading the Europeans to accuse the U.S.
of taking a pro-Russian stance. In response, Soros-affiliated organizations
began launching another protest campaign against the administration under the
pretext of events in Gaza.
Trump, in turn, threatened Soros with a criminal case and
made it clear to the Europeans and Ukrainians that the U.S. would withdraw from
all Ukrainian formats anyway. He signaled that this was their last chance for
negotiations with Russia with U.S. support, and after this, they would be on
their own. This is a bold but complex move. On the one hand, Europe admits it
cannot provide the necessary support for Ukraine without U.S. involvement to
give Kiev a chance to hold out until at least next summer (when the U.S.
midterm election campaign will be in full swing and Republicans would be
vulnerable to scandalous accusations of "working for Putin"). On the
other hand, neither Kiev nor the Europeans are willing to accept Russian peace
terms, even with possible minor technical concessions. They either believe
Trump is bluffing or hope to pressure him into backing down.
Trump is holding back, betting that if Ukraine collapses in
the coming months, he can pin the blame on the Europeans who didn't listen to
his "wonderful offer" after the Alaska talks with Putin. By taking
responsibility for supporting Ukraine, they would have failed completely. A
collapse of Ukraine - a crumbling front, an end to AFU resistance, and the
flight of the government abroad - would end the war in Europe and allow Trump
to focus on China.
But there's a catch. Trump's position will be strong only if
the EU fails to organize a new military provocation against Russia and if,
after the collapse of the Kiev government, Europe/Russia talks don't begin. The
latter is unlikely but not impossible. In the first scenario, the U.S. would
have to intervene, at least diplomatically, because it cannot allow Europe to
be completely defeated by Russia. In the second scenario, U.S. intervention is
inevitable, as Washington cannot allow the EU to reach its own agreement with
Moscow and break free from the American umbrella, restoring relations with
Russia enough for a gradual economic revival. In essence, Europe is currently
demonstrating to the U.S. a willingness to lose Ukraine but, in doing so, is
trying to tie Washington's hands in the China theater.
If the EU can keep Kiev afloat, even after losing all of the
left-bank territories and with fighting starting on the right bank of the
Dnieper, until the active phase of the congressional election campaign, the
situation in Ukraine will become a major factor in the American election and
begin to independently influence the positions of politicians from both
parties.
If neither side is bluffing, both are making a risky bet
where the win or loss of geopolitical magnitude depends on the pace of the
Russian offensive and the AFU's ability to hold the front a few months longer
than calculated, or, conversely, if the Ukrainian front collapses sooner. It
seems both sides don't believe the opponent is willing to go all the way. The
bet is that the opponent will "blink first." Trump is also counting
on his conservative allies within the EU who are actively preventing Brussels from
mobilizing resources to support Kiev, while the Europeans are clearly counting
on the activation of Trump's left-liberal opponents in the U.S., from Soros-led
"protests" to the systemic work of anti-Trump Republicans and the
mobilization of Democratic political resources. The level of internal tension
in the U.S. is evident from the fact that Trump has begun political purges in
the government bodies available to him. However, it should be noted that he is
unable to conduct a total cleansing of the American political and media landscape,
and the opposing forces are clearly conducting an urgent mobilization.
The results of this European-Trump confrontation will be
clear by the end of autumn 2025, or by early spring 2026 at the latest. But the
very fact of a sharp division between the U.S. and Europe, which cannot be
quickly overcome (it will last at least a couple of months, maybe more than six
months), opens a window of opportunity for Russia to achieve a Ukrainian
settlement on its most favorable terms. This will be possible if the Kiev
government and AFU collapse this year. In this matter and at this stage, the
tactical interests of the Kremlin and Trump largely coincide.