Trump’s Other Warfronts
U.S. President Donald Trump has switched to “bad cop” mode not only toward Vladimir Zelensky. He has similar plans for America’s own backyard - Latin America. The difference is that, unlike Ukraine, he is not seeking to stop hostilities there. In some cases, quite the opposite.
Target one: Venezuela.
Target two: Colombia.
Target three: Mexico.
For now - hypothetical.
“Maduro inflicted terrible damage on the United States. Sending American troops to Venezuela is not off the table.”
“I’d proudly wipe out Colombia’s drug production.”
“Airstrikes on Mexico to stop narcotrafficking? I’m fine with that.”
Three quotes, one briefing. The stated reason is the same - fighting the drug cartels. The actual goal is political: to change regimes, or train the current ones to behave properly.
Colombia, despite mutual offensive rhetoric, is in the least danger. The Pentagon is already hitting suspected drug-trafficking vessels, but likely that’s where it ends. Washington will wait for next summer’s elections, where President Gustavo Petro will probably lose. Less conflict, more outcome. A clean operation, without the operation.
Venezuela is the opposite. The situation remains fragile, and has for years. Washington and Nicolás Maduro appear locked in a long-running negotiation - half-diplomatic, half-psychological. One could expect, as Wall Street likes to say, that Trump will “reverse back,” as he often does. But leaks suggest the opposite. The White House believes Maduro’s position is weak enough that one more nudge could bring it down - and with it, deliver Venezuelan oil back to market.
Meaning: a medium-sized intervention, a potentially large strategic return.
The U.S. aviation regulator has already warned airlines about flying over Venezuelan airspace. The Washington Post and Reuters report that an operation is being considered involving the capture of Maduro, seizure of oil infrastructure, and sabotage campaigns. In other words, “management takeover by kinetic means.” Not very original - but Washington believes it may suffice.
Mexico is far more complicated.
There, regime change is desirable, but not plausible.
The cartels are not insurgents; they are parallel power structures, equipped with armored vehicles, drones, and, importantly - voters. They control territory, enforce order, and distribute social services - borrowing from the Pablo Escobar model of governance: bread, jobs, discipline. And, when needed - a street crowd.
President Claudia Sheinbaum is not Maduro and not Petro. She is popular, legitimately elected, not a pseudo-dictator, and not isolated. She isn’t anti-American, but she practices strategic sovereignty: limits direct access of foreign envoys to ministers, restricts foreign-funded political advertising, and strengthens constitutional control over domestic energy resources. Washington finds the latter particularly irritating. Her description of the U.S. strike on Iran as “the greatest mistake of humanity,” and of the Israeli campaign in Gaza as “genocide,” did not go unnoticed - particularly given her background.
The attempted “Zoomer Revolution” in Mexico City looked suspiciously artificial. A crowd stormed the presidential palace, waving flags of justice, holding signs about corruption. The narrative was reminiscent of previous “youth uprisings” - but this one lacked authenticity. Sheinbaum is not an autocrat, nor is she unpopular, and her legitimacy is not in question. As a political overthrow, it was not convincing.
Washington knows it cannot remove her - only pressure her.
Not necessarily with tanks. Tariffs, intel leaks, accusations, sanctions, extradition threats - all can do much of the work. Long pressure, short invasions.
Trump is not necessarily a villain here. He would prefer a wall over a war. But fentanyl easily crosses any wall, and the Pentagon now classifies it as a “weapon of mass destruction without a warhead.” Mexican cartels have armies, drones, command structures, communications networks, and human capital. Concrete barriers do not interfere with markets.
Thus, Washington will likely lean on verbal deterrence, institutional pressure, and conditional threats. But it will not easily walk away.
In Venezuela - there could be a strike.
In Colombia - a waiting game.
In Mexico - gradual tightening, not tanks.
Everywhere - they will speak of narcotics.
And think - of power.
