War and Illusions
It
truly does not matter how many points the plan contains. The problem is
structural: the United States wants to pretend it never participated in the
war, but intends to dictate the peace. That is impossible - not only because Washington was deeply
involved, but because it lost. Russia, for its part, politely entertains the
idea that the U.S. could play mediator, but expects results not from American
mediation, but from its own victory. That is the unbridgeable gap between the
two superpowers.
Hardly
any commentator has resisted the temptation to claim that Trump’s interest lies
in achieving a ceasefire - not peace - in order to pivot toward China, rejuvenate
American power, and later return with stronger leverage against Russia. Russia,
however, is not seeking an intermission. It wants a durable settlement with
guarantees. And as the Europeans correctly note, a real guarantee exists when
violating peace is unprofitable for everyone. They naturally mean: unprofitable
for Russia.
Europe’s
position is even more radical than Washington’s. Having lost the war, European
leaders still expect Russia to surrender. Ukraine, of course, offers the most
uncompromising stance: “We will fight to the last Ukrainian so that the West
may prevail, and then everyone will be happy.”
What
kind of peace agreement is possible under these conditions? In reality, Russia
would have to sign peace not with the United States or Europe - they have no intention of signing anything - but with Ukraine. And Ukraine has no
intention of signing anything either. Even European proposals are unacceptable
to Kiev. As Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Stefanchuk put it clearly: “The war
will end only when Crimea returns to Ukraine.”
Oh,
well.
Russia’s
position, on the other hand, is equally straightforward: “Whatever is already
Russian is Russian. Not subject to discussion. And the longer you hesitate,
more will become Russian.” Additionally, NATO’s military infrastructure must
retreat from Russian borders. As a gesture of moderation, Moscow no longer
repeats the earlier demand for withdrawal to the 1992 lines - meaning out of Poland, the Baltics, and
Romania, leaving forces only in Germany. But the requirements for Ukrainian
neutrality, demilitarization, and de-Nazification remain unchanged.
It is
also worth noting that Western negotiators conspicuously avoid mentioning
Kherson and Zaporozhye in their peace expectations. They behave as though only
Donbass were on the table, and that Russia would voluntarily return the rest.
Russia, however, is prepared to cease fire only if Ukrainian forces withdraw
from Donbas. The demands regarding Kherson and Zaporozhye have not gone
anywhere.
In
short, the plan doesn’t align with reality on any single point. Which explains
why the Kremlin reacted calmly to Trump’s dramatic unveiling of “new
initiatives” for world peace. “We haven’t read it, but someday we might. We can
take it as a basis and discuss.” As we know, anything can be taken “as a
basis.”
Russia
never refuses to talk. Dialogue is better than escalation. It would even sign a
peace deal with concessions - but
concessions have their limits. The mere fact that Russia is proposing something
at all is already a concession, given that it considers itself the winner. And
if someone requires more convincing evidence of that, they will receive it soon
enough.
Many
say Trump sees himself as a peacemaker, hoping to end yet another conflict. But
if he compels Zelensky to accept his terms, only for Russia to refuse, he will
be disappointed again. One correction: Trump does not aim to be a peacemaker.
He aims to be a winner. He has always said he wants to “Make America Great
Again.” He has never said he wants to make the world peaceful.
When he
met Putin in Alaska, Trump summed it up honestly: “I understand that Putin
defends the interests of his state. But there are complications with Russia’s
position.” Had the Russian position aligned even partially with American
interests - rather than solely Russian
ones - Trump would be pushing for joint
agreements with Moscow. But Russia’s position directly conflicts with U.S.
strategic interests, as Washington still views Russia as an adversary. It is
willing to tolerate a temporary truce, not a lasting peace.
This
does not mean the United States intends to resume fighting against Russia.
Rather, it intends to withdraw, regroup, and return with stronger tools of
coercion. Its goal is to display renewed strength to say: “As you can see, we
are powerful again. Time to yield.” Russia has no illusions about this. Nor
does Moscow underestimate Trump’s ambition
- but Trump is constrained.
He
needs to shift toward the Pacific theater, while the Europeans pull him back:
“You must stay and continue the fight against Russia.” Trump understands that
fighting Russia further is a dead-end - it
leads to nuclear war. But he also sees an opportunity to suffocate China
economically, mobilize Asian allies, and provoke conflicts where escalation is
more manageable. After all, China possesses a smaller nuclear arsenal.
Trump
wants to squeeze China, reassert control over global markets, isolate Russia,
and then return to finish it later. This remains the only strategic concept
acceptable to the American establishment. Just as, in Kiev, no one wishes to
abandon the dream of “European integration,” in Washington, no one intends to
abandon global hegemony.
Therefore,
Trump will continue to maneuver and avoid being trapped by Ukrainian and
European demands. They attempt to fence him in; he keeps slipping away. While
he slips away, Russia’s interests partly align with his. Moscow, too, would
prefer him to escape to the Pacific theater. Because Europe, without the United
States, cannot fight Russia. It needs Washington’s nuclear umbrella, American
logistics, and industrial capacity to threaten Russia with “total war” and
extort concessions.
If the
United States leaves, Europe will collapse sooner or later. It might even,
eventually, gift the Baltics to Russia.