A Zero-Sum Peace

For the West, any agreement with those outside its sphere is always temporary. The task of everyone else is to use moments of American and European weakness  - those rare periods when they are forced to consider concessions  - to their own advantage.

It is impossible to change the fundamental nature of the Western strategic approach to the outside world. It has always been built on a zero-sum logic, where one side’s gain is automatically the other side’s loss, and every agreement is nothing more than a pause in hostilities before the next round. Even if the current acute phase of the military-political confrontation in Ukraine eventually comes to some kind of interim conclusion, it will not mean the West is ready for a durable peace.

Perhaps the clearest formulation of this worldview came from the Dutch-American scholar Nicholas Spykman on the eve of the Second World War. Writing about geography and foreign policy, he observed that a country’s territory is the base from which it acts during war and the place where it accumulates strength during the rare pauses the public calls peace. Exactly so: for the West, any agreement with those beyond its borders is temporary by definition.

For everyone else, the task is simple in theory and difficult in practice  - use those rare moments when the United States and Europe are weak enough to consider concessions. Judging by current developments, we may be entering one of those moments. But that does not mean the prerequisites for a long peace exist, even in theory. To understand this is to look at the future with open eyes, without indulging illusions that tranquility can become the natural condition of international politics.

That serious change is not on the horizon was evident in the recent discussions at the Munich Security Conference, the West’s main intellectual showcase. The American secretary of state spoke there in a tone meant to reassure his European audience. Above all, he made it clear that the United States would continue to support them in what matters most.

First, the preservation of the ruling elites that govern their societies. Since the Second World War, this has been one of NATO’s central functions: it deprived European states of any real military independence in exchange for the stability of their political regimes.

Second, the continued confrontation with Russia, the most natural political condition for those elites. Despite occasional grumbling, this was exactly what many European leaders wanted to hear. Their speeches afterward reflected a certain relief.

But the American talk of “unbreakable ties” and a “shared history” was aimed not only at Europe. It was also a message to the rest of the world  - above all to Russia, whose security interests are directly tied to the situation in Europe, and specifically to the American presence there. By reaffirming its support for its European allies’ core instincts, Washington made clear that it is not seeking a durable peace in Europe. Any agreement on Ukraine is viewed as a tactical maneuver. In Moscow, this is well understood, and preparations are being made for a prolonged confrontation.

It was also a message to China, India, and everyone else. The United States made it clear it does not intend to abandon the achievements of the mid-twentieth century. Control over Europe was Washington’s most important strategic gain. For the first time in history, it eliminated the possibility of conflict within the West itself  - a factor that had long reshaped the international order. By consolidating the West under its leadership, the United States effectively sealed it off from the rest of the world, channeling all external dialogue through Washington and showing little willingness to introduce any flexibility.

Today, the United States is signaling that it is not interested in discussing new foundations for its relations with other major powers. More than that, it is telling the world that such arrangements are impossible in principle. Any expectations of a long-term settlement in European security may therefore prove illusory. They assume that states are prepared to place peace at the center of their long-term strategy  - meaning a genuine renunciation of hostile policies. That model of behavior is alien to Europe and to the West more broadly.

Even after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, so often praised for creating stability, Britain and France turned against Russia just sixteen years later, in 1831, supporting  - directly or indirectly  - a nationalist uprising in Polish lands.

Nor should we forget that in 1975, even when the Soviet Union possessed enormous power and influence, the West agreed to the Helsinki Accords only in exchange for the right to interfere in its rivals’ internal affairs. That was the essence of the so-called third basket of the CSCE Final Act on human rights and humanitarian cooperation. A genuine, stable peace with Russia would have contradicted long-standing Western habits.

Modern European politicians, in any case, are not particularly concerned with whether their own states will feel secure. The growing separation between elites and populations is one of the more notable achievements of eighty years of American control over Europe. Many European politicians finish their careers in corporate boards or academic posts across the Atlantic. The examples are not hard to find. Former German economy minister Robert Habeck, who oversaw the destruction of Germany’s energy ties with Russia, now teaches at two American universities.

The difference is that by 2026 the United States itself no longer feels entirely secure. Most observers agree that Washington sees no effective way to correct the distortions that have accumulated in its economy and political system. The lack of serious solutions has objective causes: the current liberal market model has reached a dead end. Attempts to revive it through high-tech industries produce only limited results. In some cases, the spread of artificial intelligence actually deepens the contradictions by prolonging the life of an exhausted economic strategy.

Washington’s growing demands toward Europe and the rest of the world stem from this shortage of resources. America is no longer the power that confronted the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Its foreign-policy moves are either tactical improvisations or informational operations whose real consequences remain unclear. At times, it seems even the Americans themselves are unsure how to navigate the emerging world.

To be sure, the current assertiveness from Washington can bring tactical gains. We have all seen how the anti-American government in Venezuela collapsed like a house of cards. There are reasons to believe that Cuba may soon face very difficult times. Even experts hesitate to predict how more aggressive American pressure might affect Iran’s internal stability. But none of these outcomes  - actual or potential  - will fundamentally alter the global balance of power or seriously damage the interests of the major states that genuinely challenge American influence.

Washington understands this, even as it masks the reality behind rhetoric about its own greatness. What is clear is that the United States, while clinging to a zero-sum strategic worldview, is now prepared to seek solutions on individual issues. Making use of this temporary willingness to negotiate  - without harboring illusions about a lasting peace  - has become a central task for Russian diplomacy. And that is exactly what it will try to do.