The End of Françafrique
Millions of headlines proclaimed that Niger had
declared war on France. Formally, this is not the case. And in practical terms
it is not entirely clear with whom Niger intends to fight. There are no French
troops left in the country. They departed at the end of 2023. Yet the broader
reality remains: Africa’s war against colonialism continues.
Niger announced the beginning of military actions
against France. The statement was made before a crowd at a stadium in Niamey by
the military chief under the President of Niger, Amadou Ibro. He clarified that
previously there had been no state of war, but that now there was no
alternative but to enter one.
Legally speaking, this cannot be considered a
formal declaration of war. Nor is it clear how such a war would even be
conducted, given the absence of French soldiers. What we are witnessing is a
sharp escalation in anti-French rhetoric by Niger’s authorities. And there are
reasons for that escalation.
Until July 2023, Niger remained France’s last ally
in the region. Then a military coup removed the pro-French President Mohamed
Bazoum. A junta led by Abdourahamane Tchiani took power. De facto, Tchiani
rules the country, while much of the international community continues to
recognize Bazoum, who remains under house arrest.
The new authorities immediately adopted a
confrontational course toward the former metropole. Their first decisions
included demanding the withdrawal of French troops, completed by December, and
halting uranium and gold exports to France.
To understand the scale of this move, consider the
numbers. Niger holds approximately 404,000 tons of uranium reserves, ranking
fifth globally. Nigerien uranium accounts for about 40 percent of France’s
needs. France is the only European country that has preserved large-scale
nuclear energy, which produces over 70 percent of its electricity. It is also
the only EU country possessing nuclear weapons. Uranium is required for both.
Yes, uranium can be sourced elsewhere. But that
means higher costs, new logistics, new contracts. If this is not a knockout, it
is certainly a knockdown. Moreover, Niger was the last country in the region
hosting French troops after their withdrawal from Burkina Faso, the Central
African Republic, and Mali, where anti-French coups had already occurred.
The resource picture does not end there. The
Central African Republic possesses uranium reserves in Bakouma, as well as
diamonds and oil. Mali offers uranium and gold. The anti-French wave across the
Sahel has therefore dealt Paris a serious geopolitical blow.
Since the era of Charles de Gaulle and the formal
dismantling of old colonialism, France maintained a system known as
Françafrique. In essence, Paris provided security and political stability to
African states in exchange for privileged access to resources. Political
stability, of course, was defined in Paris as the preservation of pro-French
elites in power. Colonialism in updated packaging.
In the past decade, France conducted its
“counterterrorism” operation Barkhane across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso,
Mauritania, and Chad. Its failure to ensure security became one of the formal
justifications for the rise of anti-French forces. In reality, the reasons were
deeper. The desire to escape neo-colonial dependency. Countries rich in
resources remained among the poorest on earth. Large portions of the population
lacked access to drinking water, partly due to environmentally destructive
extraction practices. Crime was rampant. Corruption among pro-French elites was
endemic.
France departed. Russia and China arrived.
China brought money. Russia brought military
capacity. That capacity helped new governments consolidate power and impose a
degree of order that French forces had failed to establish. Whether this shift
is permanent remains open to debate. What is not disputed is that Moscow’s
military specialists achieved results where Paris had not.
Paris responded with an information campaign.
French forces, it claimed, had not been expelled but had left due to
destabilization allegedly orchestrated by a certain Russian private military
company. When Bazoum publicly declined to attend the Russia–Africa forum
shortly before his overthrow, some Western media outlets suggested Moscow stood
behind the coup.
How much Russia actively facilitated France’s
removal from its former colonies is a matter for speculation. The fact is that
Paris is deeply dissatisfied and holds Moscow responsible. It seeks redress.
In early February 2026, Russia’s Foreign
Intelligence Service stated that France was preparing neo-colonial coups in
Africa. According to the SVR, the Macron administration was “feverishly
searching” for opportunities for political revenge. Plans allegedly included
destabilizing Madagascar’s new leadership and involvement in a thwarted coup
attempt in Burkina Faso. Russian intelligence also claimed Paris had authorized
plans for the direct elimination of “undesirable leaders.”
Of particular note is the allegation that France
has begun cooperating with Islamist groups it previously fought. Increasingly,
observers also point to a “Ukrainian trace,” with Ukrainian instructors
reportedly training militants. This raises a separate question: what role will
Ukrainian fighters seek beyond the European theater?
Following Niger’s coup in 2023, the prospect of
regional war was seriously discussed. ECOWAS imposed border closures, froze
assets, suspended transactions, and threatened military intervention unless
Bazoum was restored. Mali and Burkina Faso immediately declared they would
intervene if Niger were attacked. Paris hesitated. Algeria’s memory remained
fresh. Open invasion carried risks. Proxy war was unattractive. Economic
strangulation became the preferred tool. The ousted Nigerien Prime Minister at
the time warned that the country would not withstand sanctions.
Yet sanctions did not produce regime collapse. Not
in Niger. Not elsewhere in the region.
Still unwilling to fight openly, Paris appears to
have shifted toward quieter methods.
The timing is not accidental. China is preoccupied
with trade conflicts with the United States and crises involving Venezuela and
Iran. Beijing traditionally favors economic instruments over covert action.
Russia is heavily engaged in Ukraine. It lacks the bandwidth for distant
operations on the scale of a decade ago. Wagner no longer exists in its
previous form.
For France, this is a moment of reckoning. It will
determine whether its colonial chapter closes with a definitive period.
There is also the personal dimension. President
Macron may perceive Africa’s losses as his own. His second and final term
concludes in little more than a year. Political capital is finite. In such
circumstances, leaders sometimes calculate that there is little left to lose.
Africa’s confrontation with colonial legacy is
therefore not symbolic. It is structural. And it is far from over.