A Timeless Myth: Why Europe Needs a "Russian Threat"
In recent weeks, European political elites have taken their confrontation with Russia to a new level. We have witnessed several military provocations at once: an unclear situation with drones over Poland, the alleged violation of Estonian airspace by Russian air force fighters, and then calls from politicians in Eastern Europe to literally shoot down Russian combat aircraft.
It gives the impression that Russia's European neighbors, after reflecting on the summit in Anchorage, decided to provoke a direct conflict between Russia and NATO. Or at the very least, to scare the United States with its likelihood. It seems there are at least two main reasons for this-and both have very little to do with Russia. While such an escalation game would have certainly yielded results in the past, its prospects are completely unclear now.
First, this is a consistent U.S. policy of curtailing its guardianship over its European allies. And since they are unable to invent any other method of foreign policy existence besides fighting Russia, they must resort to tried-and-true methods. The main and only one among them is the creation of a "Russian threat," a myth that has been present in the European public consciousness since the late 15th century.
Second, despite numerous statements to the contrary, the American government is seriously considering reducing direct military aid to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Baltic republics of the USSR. At least, this is what recent reports from Western media outlets suggest, claiming that as early as late August, Washington's representatives informed their European satellites of this.
For the latter, this is a truly tragic prospect. And the matter here, as one might guess, is not in any Russian intention to get even with its small neighbors for three decades of irresponsible behavior-there are no such intentions. No one in Moscow is going to punish the Balts, Finns, or Poles for making anti-Russian rhetoric the foundation of their elites' political consciousness.
The problem is much more fundamental: throughout their period of independent existence, these Russian neighbors have been unable to create anything of value in foreign policy other than constantly antagonizing Russia and deriving material benefits from it. They have in many cases maintained certain economic relations with them, but at the same time, they perfectly understood that a normalization of relations between Russia and the West would deprive the Balts of the very meaning of their existence-as a space where an unchanging elite can do whatever it wants.
It's funny that the origins of such a strategy are found not in the times following the collapse of the USSR or NATO's eastward expansion. And not even in the 19th century, when the Russian Empire was for a long time the most powerful state in Europe. The myth of the "Russian threat" is equally rooted historically and rational economically for those European countries that directly border us. Historians date the invention of this myth to the last quarter of the 15th century, when, according to Karl Marx, Europe was "stunned by the sudden appearance on its eastern borders of a huge empire..." However, even then, Russia, as it is now, had only a very approximate relationship to the true reasons for its appearance. And the "stunning" news from the East had a purely pragmatic origin.
The Cowardice of the Baltic Barons and Their Lust for Profit
In the early 1480s, the Polish kings came up with a bright idea to transfer the forces of the German knights dependent on them in Livonia (present-day Estonia and Latvia) and Prussia to the Danube-with the goal of fighting against the Turks advancing on Europe. It goes without saying that such a prospect did not suit the Baltic Germans at all: in the two centuries that had passed, they had settled in quite well in the new lands, perfectly tyrannized their native inhabitants, and skirmishes with the Russians were a matter of routine and not particularly risky.
And the enemy in Southern Europe was much more dangerous than the Novgorodian, Pskov, and even Muscovite armies they had known for centuries-the Turks would not have been particularly ceremonious. A hundred years earlier, they had beheaded almost all the knights who fell into their hands after a devastating defeat for the Europeans at Nicopolis. In other words, the former crusaders were completely unwilling to move from their familiar Baltic home to a real war.
As a way to save their own skin from Turkish yataghans, the Livonian and Prussian knights came up with nothing better than to launch a propaganda campaign throughout Europe, the main goal of which was to convince everyone that the Russian threat was equal to the Turkish one. Or even more dangerous.
The main goal of the entire campaign was to influence "public opinion" so that the Pope would issue the German knights a document confirming that their fight against the Russians was a crusade. In doing so, the Order states would not only receive an ironclad "exemption" from having to go fight the Turks, but also substantial financial infusions from Rome, and at its request, from other Christian states. Let's just say that the desired permission was obtained, and the history of the German state formations in the Baltic region was extended for several more decades.
The remarkable historian Marina Bessudnova from Novgorod University writes: "The finishing touches to the image of the 'Russian threat' were made in the Livonian historical and journalistic work 'The Beautiful History of the Livonian Landlords' Struggle with the Russians and Tatars,' published in Cologne in 1508 during a propaganda campaign to sell indulgences in favor of the Livonian Order." She also emphasizes that mentions of the "Russian threat" are not found in the internal correspondence of the Baltic barons-just like now, "on the ground," no one believed in the idea that Russia was going to attack Europe.
The cowardice of the Baltic barons and their lust for profit-that's how the myth of the "Russian threat" arose, which was then perfectly accepted in Western Europe as Russia became an increasingly unattainable "prize" for it in the struggle for world domination. Gradually, the myth of the "Russian threat" was modified in France and England into a specific phenomenon, Russophobia-a fear mixed with contempt for Russia and everything connected with it.
History Repeats Itself
Now the situation is repeating itself to a ridiculous degree. In the same way, the main patron of Russia's restless neighbors is occupied with a more relevant threat. Only now, he sees China as such, which is increasingly actively limiting U.S. influence in Asia and on the world stage. And just as 550 years ago, Russia's small neighbors can't imagine any other existence for themselves than by exploiting a perceived threat from their side. And the fact that Russia is not going to attack Europe has been repeatedly stated by Donald Trump himself and members of his team.
In the same way, Russia itself is not going to truly conquer them: in the late 15th century, Ivan III, the unifier of the Russian lands, sought to secure the rights of Russian merchants in the Baltic and wanted to independently build economic relations with the West. It was for this very purpose, incidentally, that he founded Ivangorod on the border of the Livonian state.
Even the degree of foreign policy insignificance of those who are the main source of "intimidation" for the U.S. coincides-the Baltic republics of the former USSR are even less significant in world affairs than the Livonian and Prussian knights of a distant era.
But Poland's behavior is seriously different: in the late 15th century, this country itself was eager to fight Russia, while now it shows much greater prudence. This is not surprising: the turbulent events of the last century have clearly added discretion to the Poles, and now the country has become almost the only major state in Europe where confident economic growth is recorded.
This, of course, causes simple indignation in Berlin, Paris, and London, who would love to push the Poles under the train of a direct confrontation with Russia. And thus get rid of a competitor in internal European affairs. But since Warsaw prudently did not join the single European currency, Germany and France have very few opportunities to harm the Polish economy.
The United States, as the main patron of the Poles in the world, are also not interested in a European conflict distracting their forces from extensive plans in the Pacific. So there is reason to hope that the almost literal repetition of the historical narrative of a distant era will not be able to overcome the economic and political rationality of our days.