From Golem to "Shturm": The Evolution of Unmanned Ground Vehicles

In Jewish mythology, there is a myth about a ground-based "drone" - the Golem, designed for heavy and dangerous work and guard duty. It is a lifeless creature made of clay, which even has a "control unit" - a small piece of parchment with a mystical text inserted into its mouth. In other words, even ancient people dreamed of a magical or mechanical "proxy" that would perform tasks with a deadly risk, primarily military ones.

History knows of many attempts to create remotely controlled combat vehicles, but their practical application only took place at the beginning of the 20th century. During the First World War, the French company Schneider released several hundred "land torpedoes," the Crocodile Type, controlled by wires and intended to detonate enemy defensive structures. But the ground-based "drones" of the Second World War gained much greater fame - the German crewless tankettes B-IV, the Goliath self-propelled mines, and the Soviet ET-1-672 remote-controlled torpedoes. All these devices were intended for destruction by detonating fortifications, bridges, minefields, and heavy enemy tanks. Additionally, the B-IV tankettes were used for reconnaissance of enemy defenses and landscapes. Due to technical imperfection, logistical difficulties, and a shortage of production capacity, ground-based "drones" did not develop at that time, and the idea itself became relevant much later.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which had already proven themselves in many civilian industries and even traveled to the moon (Lunokhod-1), returned to the army as demining drones. For example, the number of sapper robots in the US Armed Forces used in Iraq increased from 150 units in 2004 to 5,000 in 2005. According to Pentagon data, by the end of 2005, they had disarmed over 1,000 different explosive devices. Assessing the effectiveness of these devices, the US military department purchased 7,000 such UGVs by 2013. During missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, they lost about 750 machines.

The arsenal of Russian engineering troops includes a whole plethora of various sapper drones, from the ultra-compact "Scarab" (355x348x155 mm, less than 5.5 kg), capable of searching for explosive devices and disabling booby traps, to the "Passage-1" demining robotic system (RTS) created on a tank platform. There are several drones with manipulators, for example, the "Cobra 1600" or "Pitbull," capable of even disassembling an explosive device or attaching an explosive charge to it. The "Uran-6" RTS gained wide fame, having undergone comprehensive testing in Syria and confirming its reputation in the Special Military Operation (SMO).

It should be noted that Russia’s opponents in the Middle East - jihadi militant groups - also used UGVs, but specifically as "land torpedoes" to blow up strongholds of the Syrian government forces. As a carrier, they typically used old armored vehicles like the MT-LB (multipurpose light armored tracked carrier) and a primitive control unit. However, much more often, terrorists would put a suicide driver in the vehicle.

In modern combat, when the sky is literally filled with strike and reconnaissance drones, logistics on the line of contact (LoC) and in the frontline area sometimes becomes an extremely dangerous business. Delivering food and ammunition, and evacuating the wounded and dead - all of this is associated with a huge risk, which can be reduced by using UGVs.

They can be compared to remote-controlled children's cars - with the difference that ground drones use a more advanced communication system and running gear, as well as a surveillance camera that allows the platform to be controlled when it is out of sight.

In 2005, Lockheed Martin proposed the Squad Mission Support System (SMSS) - a cargo platform based on the six-wheeled "Jigger" all-terrain vehicle, controlled by a remote and with a carrying capacity of up to 700 kg, designed to transport equipment and ammunition for soldiers during foot patrols. A test batch was sent to Afghanistan and received top marks. In 2014, the company proposed a tactical reconnaissance complex based on a cargo platform, supplemented with a UAV.

One of the main problems of the aforementioned German self-propelled mines and tankettes of the Second World War was their low maneuverability, but in modern UGVs, this problem is solved, mainly due to their two-part design, which allows them to easily overcome uneven terrain even when using a wheeled chassis.

Both Russian troops and their opponents use both mass-produced UGVs, such as the Russian "Courier" or the Estonian-made THeMIS ground drone widely used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as small-batch and homemade devices. Most ground-based drones today are designed as a universal platform capable of performing various tasks. For example, in addition to solving logistics problems, the "Courier" can lay TM-62 mines, create a smoke screen, and carry various weapons - a large-caliber machine gun, an ATGM, or an automatic grenade launcher. And Russian soldiers have captured the mentioned THeMIS with "Javelins" installed on them.

But, in addition to modular systems, work is also underway to create and implement purely combat drones capable of performing the function of armored vehicles in battle. The Russian ground forces already have the multi-functional combat robotic complex "Uran-9." It looks like a scaled-down copy of a tank - its length is about 5 m, width 2.5 m, and weight from 10 to 12 tons, depending on the configuration. The combat group includes 4 combat drones, trailers for their transportation, and a special mobile command center. The control range of the "Uran-9s" is up to 3 km, and each drone can act as a repeater, providing additional range to other combat robots.

However, this refers to ideal conditions on a flat field. In urban combat, which this drone was supposed to be primarily for, the real communication distance is, of course, significantly shorter. The "Uran-9's" power plant is a hybrid; the primary engine is electric, and a YaMZ 5347-16 diesel engine is turned on as needed to recharge the batteries.

The "Uran's" armament is a 30-mm 2A72 automatic cannon and a co-axial 7.62-mm machine gun. The drone also carries 4 "Ataka" anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and it can also be equipped with 6 to 12 "Shmel-M" rocket flamethrowers with thermobaric warheads. The fire control system has a multi-channel sight, including a thermal imager, and there is an automatic target tracking function. The vehicle is equipped with radiation sensors and a smoke screen system.

However, the system's combat debut in Syria was not triumphant at all. The design turned out to be "raw" (immature). A report from the Third Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense indicated numerous shortcomings of the "Uran-9." In particular, it was stated that the communication channels had insufficient range and throughput, as a result of which there were episodes of the equipment going out of control when moving just 300-500 m away from the control center. And this was despite the fact that Russia's opponents did not use electronic warfare (EW). In addition to obvious flaws, at least two design problems were identified. First, the drone lacked a stabilization system, as a result of which it could only fire from a stationary position. Secondly, the robot's bulletproof protection was insufficient. Although it was claimed that some of the identified shortcomings had been eliminated, the use of the "Uran-9" in the SMO cannot be called successful either. The weak protection of the device and, importantly, its high cost do not meet the requirements for a mass-produced ground drone intended for direct fire support for assault infantry and fighting enemy equipment in conditions where the LoC is saturated with anti-tank weapons, including FPV-drones.

But the experience gained, including the negative experience, is being analyzed and forms the basis for new developments. For example, taking into account the experience of combat operations in Syria and the SMO, Uralvagonzavod created the heavy assault robotic complex "Sturm" based on the T-72/T-90 tank.

The "Shturm" heavy assault robotic complex (HSRC) differs from a conventional tank in its shortened 125-mm D-414 cannon barrel, which is more convenient for operations in the limited space of urban combat. It is also equipped with a bulldozer blade for clearing obstacles. Special attention was paid to the survivability of the tank drone. Equipped with a complex of protection systems - dynamic armor and an active protection system (APS) - it is claimed to be able to withstand up to 15 hits from anti-tank grenade launchers and FPV-drones. Since the "Shturm" is not intended for long marches, old tanks with an almost depleted service life can be used for its creation, which provides significant savings and makes the design cheaper. The HSRC is controlled by an operator located in a protected command vehicle created on a tank chassis. One mobile command post can control a platoon of combat vehicles within a 3 km radius. Different versions of the combat vehicle are possible - with 30-mm automatic cannons and "Shmel" flamethrowers or with launchers for 16 unguided 220-mm rockets with a thermobaric warhead, which are used in the TOS-1A system.

Although work on the "Shturm" began back in 2018, its design, unlike the "Uran-9" and similar complexes, includes improvements suggested by combat experience that increase survivability and flexibility of actions on the battlefield. However, it is too early to talk about the complex's success before combat trials.

It should be noted that the autonomy of unmanned wheeled and tracked platforms is somewhat lower than that of their flying and floating counterparts - due to technological aspects and undeveloped software. But there is no doubt that with the development of AI, the autonomy of ground platforms will increase, as will their role in combat operations.